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Introduction 
 
Behavioral and experimental economics are two relatively recent and closely related 
fields in economics. Experimental economics adds experiments as a method of research 
to theoretical modeling, empirical analysis of real world data and simulations. This 
method is not specific to any field of economics, and experiments have been used for a 
long time, but it is in connection with behavioral economics that experiments have 
become more refined and often used. Behavioral economics relaxes two important 
assumptions that are at the core of almost all economic modeling: That humans are 
rational and selfish (money maximizing). After giving up these, experimental methods 
are used to answer the question: If not rational and selfish, what else instead? 
 
Relaxing the rationality assumption questions the assertion that humans behave as if 
they were strong and flawless computers, capable of performing calculations of 
arbitrary difficulty instantly, without ever making a mistake. And indeed, there are 
many results that show humans to be only boundedly rational, or to be subject to biases 
that deviate from rationality. The first part of the dissertation falls into this branch of 
behavioral economics. Learning theories postulate that, in dynamic decision situations, 
humans use rules of thumb, based on the observable history, to help them decide. We 
test some computerized versions of learning theories that try to describe human 
behavior, and find that, with one exception, they are rather easily manipulated by their 
(human) opponents. 
 
A second branch of behavioral literature stems from a weakening of the second 
assumption, selfishness. That is, humans try not only to maximize their own outcome, 
but also care for the effects their behavior has on other humans. This is commonly 
called other-regarding preferences, or social preferences. In the second part of the 
dissertation, we look at a special form of other-regarding preferences, punishment. In a 
one shot, anonymous game punishment does not serve any monetary purpose. Yet, in 
experiments, subjects use punishment, even if it is costly and they themselves can not 
derive any profit from punishing. We investigate punishment when it is risky, and 
whether subjects have a desire to punish personally. 
 
In the first chapter, we explore how human subjects placed in a repeated Cournot 
duopoly react to opponents who play according to five popular learning theories: 
(Myopic) Best Response, Fictitious Play, Reinforcement Learning, Trial & Error and 
Imitate-the-Best. All of these have been proposed in the literature as theories to model 
and describe the behavior of humans. The usual test of these models in the literature is 
to measure real human behavior (for example in laboratory experiments) and then to fit 
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the learning theories to the observed behavior. We turn around the stick and ask: If 
someone indeed behaved according to these theories, how would others react, and how 
successful would he be? To achieve this, we program computer algorithms that play 
according to the above learning theories and let subjects play against these algorithms. 
The main experiment was implemented as an internet study, enabling us to recruit a 
diverse set of subjects who played outside of the usual, artificial, laboratory setting. 
However, we also include a laboratory treatment to check for qualitative differences. 
 
Despite not being informed about the specific learning theory they are matched with, 
our subjects prove to be surprisingly successful. They achieve high average payoffs and, 
importantly, higher payoffs than the learning theories. The only exception to this are 
subjects who are matched with Imitate-the-Best. Looking at the learning theories used, 
it turns out that all but Imitate-the-Best can be induced to play low, accommodating 
quantities in later round by aggressive, high-quantity play by the human subjects in 
early rounds. These early high quantities lead to up-front lower profits but are rewarded 
by higher long term profits. Imitate-the-Best is the only algorithm that can not be 
influenced in this way. We conclude that subjects are not merely playing myopically in 
each round of the repeated game, but “strategically teach” their opponents to play in a 
way that raises future own profits. 
 
While the first chapter is rather explorative, the second part of the dissertation looks at a 
topic that has already received considerable attention in the literature: Punishment by 
peers. We investigate punishment in two special cases, direct, personal punishment, and 
punishment as a risky instrument. 
 
Chapter two is concerned with the way punishment is enacted. Do punishing subjects 
seek only a decrease in the well-being of the “offender”, or do they want to personally 
bring that decrease about, do they want to be involved in the act of punishment? 
Subjects having such a desire to punish personally, instead of punishment being enacted 
by someone else, would imply that the way punishment is institutionalized, e.g. in 
justice systems where punishment is enacted by state employees, will have an impact on 
the utility of those who were wronged. 
 
We implement punishment in a design where the desire to punish personally is 
separated from other potential incentives. Subjects bid for the right to be the ones to 
punish in a second price auction. Bidders can neither affect the probability or strength of 
punishment, which is fixed earlier in the game, nor can they send a signal to the 
offender. The act of punishment is represented by physical destruction of a part of the 
offender’s allocation. While at first sight the results seem to indicate that subjects are 
willing to spend money to win the right to punish personally, that view is tempered by a 
control treatment which consists of an auction alone, without punishment or other 
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monetary prize. In the control subjects do not bid less compared to the main treatment. 
Therefore, at least for the form of punishment we implement in the lab (of course, the 
experiment can not include physical harm to the offender), we do not find evidence for a 
desire to punish personally. 
 
The main question of chapter three is the interaction between risk and punishment. It is 
well known that many subjects are not risk neutral. At the same time, many subjects 
show other-regarding preferences, e.g. by engaging in costly punishment. When other-
regarding preferences are modeled, risk aversion is typically not taken into account at 
all, despite the fact that punishment need not always happen under conditions where 
outcomes are certain. We look at possible interactions in a one-shot prisoner’s dilemma 
game with punishment opportunity. In one treatment, punishment is certain, while in 
another treatment, the outcome of punishment is subject to a lottery. At the same time, 
we measure risk aversion via a Holt-Laury test. 
 
Chapter four looks at the similar question of changes in cooperation rates in the 
prisoner’s dilemma for risk-averse subjects, conditional on punishment being present in 
the design. Both papers are based on the same experimental data and suffer from a lack 
of instances of punishment happening. To create enough data-points, we tried to 
maximize both the number of punishment worthy defection-cooperation pairs and 
subsequent punishment. While we achieved many defection-cooperation pairs, subjects 
only rarely punish. This might be due to the fact that we use a one-shot prisoner’s 
dilemma or the parameterization of our experiment. For the question of cooperation 
behavior, this explains the unchanged behavior of subjects we find, if subjects correctly 
predicted the low amount of punishment. Regarding punishment under risk, the results 
rely only on a very restricted dataset, but point in the direction that subjects are not 
impacted by risk on other’s payoff as they are by risk in their own payoff. 
 
I. RageAgainst theMachines: HowSubjects Play
Against Learning Algorithms
Abstract
We use a large-scale internet experiment to explore how subjects learn to play against
computers that are programmed to follow one of a number of standard learning algorithms.
The learning theories are (unbeknown to subjects) a best response process, ctitious play,
imitation, reinforcement learning, and a trial & error process. We explore how subjects
performances depend on their opponentslearning algorithm. Furthermore, we test whether
subjects try to inuence those algorithms to their advantage in a forward-looking way
(strategic teaching). We nd that strategic teaching occurs frequently and that all learning
algorithms are subject to exploitation with the notable exception of imitation.
Paper co-authored by Albert Kolb, Jörg Oechssler, Burkhard Schipper
1 Introduction
In recent years, theories of learning in games have been extensively studied in experiments.
The focus of those experiments was primarily the question which learning theories de-
scribe best the average behavior of subjects. It turns out that some very simply adaptive
procedures like reinforcement learning, best response dynamics, or imitation are fairly suc-
cessful in describing average learning behavior of subjects in some games (see e.g. Erev
and Haruvy, 2008, for a recent survey).
The focus of the current experiment is di¤erent. We are interested in the following
strategic aspects of learning in games. First, how is a players success a¤ected by the way
opponents learn? Second, how can the opponents learning process be inuenced by the
players behavior? For example, can it be manipulated to the players advantage? To
address those questions, we present here a rst - very exploratory - experimental study.
Since we are interested in how subjects respond to certain learning theories, we need to be
able to control the behavior of opponents. The best way to do that is by letting subjects
play against computers programmed with particular learning theories.1
The questions raised in this paper seem to be fairly novel, although the second question
has received some attention at least in the theoretical literature.2 For example, Fudenberg
and Levine (1998, p. 261) write A player may attempt to manipulate his opponents
learning process and try to teachhim how to play the game. This issue has been studied
extensively in models of reputation e¤ects, which typically assume Nash equilibrium but
not in the context of learning theory.Following Camerer and Ho (2001) and Camerer, Ho,
and Chong (2002) we shall call this aspect of learning strategic teaching.3 We believe that
this hitherto largely neglected aspect of learning is of immense importance and deserves
further study. As we shall see in this experiment, theories just based on adaptive processes
will not do justice to the manipulation attempts of subjects.
We consider ve learning theories in a Cournot duopoly: best-response (br), ctitious
play (c), imitate-the-best (imi), reinforcement learning (re), and trial & error (t&e). Some
noise is added in order to make the task less obvious. Noise is also a requirement for some
1Subjects are, of course, being told that they play against computers. There is now a large experimental
literature making use of computers to control for some playersbehavior in strategic situation. See Cason
and Sharma (2007) for a recent experiment.
2See Fudenberg and Levine (1989) and Ellison (1997).
3Note, however, that we use the term in a broader sense, not necessarily referring to EWA as in Camerer
et al. (2002).
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of the theoretical predictions to work as it prevents a learning process from getting stuck
at states which are not stochastically stable.4 The selection of learning theories is based
on the prominence in the literature, convenient applicability to the Cournot duopoly, and
su¢ cient variety of theoretical predictions.
The experiment was conducted as a large scale internet experiment. Internet experi-
ments are still relatively novel (see e.g. Drehmann, Oechssler, and Roider, 2005, for rst
experiences). Arguably, the setting (working at home or in the o¢ ce at your own PC) is
more representative of real world decisions than in the usual laboratory experiments. Also,
internet experiments allow to reach a large subject pool at moderate cost.5
With respect to the rst question, we nd that subjects achieve substantially higher
prots than all of their computer opponents but one. The exception is the imitation
algorithm, for which we show theoretically that it cannot be beaten by more than a small
margin and which in fact performs on average better than its human opponents in the
experiment. The computer opponent that allows for the highest prots for its human
counterparts is the reinforcement learning computer. However, due to the stochastic nature
of reinforcement learning, a lot of luck is needed, and the variances are high.
This leads us to the second question: We nd that strategic teaching occurs frequently
and that all learning algorithms are subject to exploitation with the notable exception of
imitation. Subjects learn quickly how to exploit the best response and trial & error
computers, usually by behaving as Stackelberg leader, although some subjects manage to
nd more innovative and even more protable ways.
Two papers are closely related to our work. Shachat and Swarthout (2002) let subjects
play against both human subjects and computers, which are programmed to follow rein-
forcement learning or experienced weighted attraction in repeated 2x2 games with a unique
Nash equilibrium in mixed strategies. They nd that human play does not signicantly
vary depending on whether the opponent is a human or a programmed learning algorithm.
In contrast, the learning algorithms respond systematically to non-Nash behavior of hu-
man subjects. Nevertheless, these adjustments are too small to result in signicant payo¤
gains. Coricelli (2005), on the other hand, found that human subjects do manage to exploit
computer opponents that play a biased version of ctitious play in repeated 2x2 zero-sum
games.
4See e.g. Vega-Redondo (1997) for imitate-the-best and Huck, Normann, and Oechssler (2004a) for trial
& error.
5Since internet experiments are relatively novel, we explore some methodological issues of this experiment
in a companion paper by comparing it to various laboratory treatments (see Duersch et al., 2008).
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The remainder of the paper is organized as follows. Section 2 describes the Cournot
game that is the basis for all treatments. In Section 3 we introduce the computer types
and the associated learning theories. The experimental design is explained in Section 4,
followed by the results in Section 5. In Section 6 we consider a laboratory treatment as a
robustness check. Section 7 concludes. The instructions for the experiment and screenshots
are shown in the Appendix.
2 The Cournot game
We consider a standard symmetric Cournot duopoly with linear inverse demand function
maxf109 Q; 0g and constant marginal cost, MC = 1. Each players quantity qi, i = 1; 2
is an element of the discrete set of actions f0; 1; :::; 109; 110g. Player is prot function is
given by
(qi; q i) := (maxf109  qi   q i; 0g   1) qi: (1)
Table 1 shows outputs and prots for the Nash equilibrium, the competitive outcome
(where p = MC = 1), the collusive outcome, the Stackelberg outcome, and the monopoly
solution. Subjects play the Cournot duopoly repeatedly for 40 rounds. Thus, we index the
quantity qti by the period t = 1; :::; 40.
Table 1: Prominent outcomes
qi q i i  i
Cournot Nash equilibrium 36 36 1296 1296
symmetric competitive outcome 54 54 0 0
symmetric collusive outcome 27 27 1458 1458
Stackelberg leader outcome 54 27 1458 729
Stackelberg follower outcome 27 54 729 1458
monopoly solution 54 0 2916 0
A Cournot duopoly is chosen for this experiment because, based on earlier theoretical
and experimental contributions, we expected that the behavior of the various learning
theories would di¤er in interesting ways in a Cournot game. In particular, there was
the conjecture that imitation would behave very di¤erently from the remaining learning
theories. In order to make this conjecture precise, we derive in this paper a new theoretical
result, namely that the imitation algorithm cannot be beaten by much even by a very
sophisticated player. Of course, this result applies only to a particular class of games that
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includes the Cournot game but also games like chicken.6
3 Computer types
Computers were programmed to play according to one of the following decision rules: Best-
response (br), ctitious play (c), imitate the best (imi), reinforcement learning (re), or
trial & error (t&e). All decision rules except reinforcement learning are deterministic,
which would make it too easy for subjects to guess the algorithm (as we experienced in
a pilot study to this project). Therefore, we introduced some amount of noise for the
deterministic processes (see below for details). The action space for all computer types
was f0; 1; :::; 109g.
All computer types require an exogenously set choice for the rst round as they can only
condition on past behavior of subjects. To be able to test whether starting values matter,
we chose di¤erent starting values. However, to have enough comparable data, we restricted
the starting values to 35, 40, and 45. Starting quantities were switched automatically every
50 plays in order to collect approximately the same number of observations for each starting
quantity but subjects were unaware of this rule.
3.1 Best-response (br)
Cournot (1838) himself suggested a myopic adjustment process based on the individual
best-response
qti = argmaxqi
(qi; q
t 1
 i ) = max
(
108  qt 1 i
2
; 0
)
; (2)
for t = 2; :::. Moreover, the parameters are such that if both players use the best-response
process, the process converges to the Nash equilibrium in a nite number of steps (see e.g.
Monderer and Shapley, 1996).
This deterministic process is supplemented by noise in the following way. If the best
response process yields some quantity qti , the computer actually plays a quantity chosen
from a Normal distribution with mean qti and standard deviation 2, rounded to the next
integer in f0; 1; :::; 109g.7 This implementation of noise is also used for computer types
ctitious play and imitation.
6We thank a referee for this observation.
7Due to a programming error in the rounding procedure, the noise of computer types br, c, and imi
was actually slightly biased downwards (by 0.5), which makes the computer player slightly less aggressive.
This does not have any lasting e¤ects for computer types br and c but has an e¤ect on imi.
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3.2 Fictitious play (c)
A second decision rule that is studied extensively in the literature is ctitious play (see
Brown, 1951, Robinson, 1951, and Fudenberg and Levine, 1998, chapter 2). A player
(that is, in our setting, the computer) who uses ctitious play chooses in each round a
myopic best response against the historical frequency of his opponents actions (amended
by an initial weight for each action). If we let those initial weights be the same for each
action and each player, w1i (q i) = w
1, we obtain the following recursive formulation for
the weight player i attaches to his opponents action q i, where 1 is added each time the
opponent chooses q i.
wti(q i) = w
t 1
i (q i) +

1 if qt 1 i = q i
0 if qt 1 i 6= q i
for t = 2; :::. Player i assigns probability
pti(q i) =
wti(q i)P
q0 i
wti(q
0
 i)
to player  i using q i in period t. Consequently, player i chooses a quantity that maximizes
his expected payo¤ given the probability assessment over the opponents quantities, i.e.,
qti 2 argmaxqi
X
q i
pti(q i)(qi; q i): (3)
We simulated the ctitious play processes against itself and some other decision rules
for many di¤erent initial weights w1 and ended up choosing w1 = 1=25. Except for much
smaller or much larger initial weights, results of the simulations did not change much.
Very high initial weights lead to rather slow adaptation whereas very small ones resulted
in erratic movements. Since our Cournot duopoly is a potential game, ctitious play
converges to the unique Cournot Nash equilibrium (see Monderer and Shapley, 1996).
3.3 Imitate the best (imi)
Imitation has received much attention recently in both theory and experiments (see e.g.
Vega-Redondo, 1997, Apesteguia et al. 2007, Schipper, 2008). The rule imitate the best
simply requires to choose the best action that was observed in the previous period. If
player i follows this decision rule in t = 2; :::, he chooses
qti =

qt 1i if (q
t 1
i ; q
t 1
 i )  (qt 1 i ; qt 1i )
qt 1 i otherwise.
(4)
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Vega-Redondo (1997) shows for a symmetric Cournot oligopoly that if all players fol-
low this decision rule up to a small amount of noise, then the long run distribution over
quantities assigns probability 1 to the competitive outcome (where p = MC) as the noise
vanishes.8 The intuition for this is simple. For all total quantities Q such that p > 1, the
rm with the highest quantity receives the highest prot. When the highest quantity is im-
itated by other rms, Q increases. For Q such that p < 1, the rm with the lowest quantity
is being imitated, such that Q decreases. Thus, Q converges to the competitive quantity.
See Huck, Normann, and Oechssler (1999) and O¤erman, Potters, and Sonnemans (2002)
for experimental evidence.
With respect to the current experiment, of particular interest is the question what
happens when only one player imitates the best? The following proposition shows that imi
can essentially not be exploited even by very sophisticated players.9
Proposition 1 Suppose a player knows that his opponent follows the rule imitate the best
( imi) and even knows the opponents starting value.
(a) If this player wants to maximize his absolute payo¤ over 40 rounds, then the optimal
strategy yields an average payo¤ of 46 374; which is much less than the prot of 55068 for
his computer opponent imi and also less than the Cournot prot of 51 840.
(b) If the player wants to maximize his relative payo¤ (i.e. the di¤erence between
his payo¤ and his opponents payo¤ ), then an optimal strategy yields an average prot
di¤erential of 212.67.
Proof: See appendix.
The implications of the proposition are the following. First, even sophisticated human
players that maximize their longrun prots in a forward looking way against imi will
achieve much lower payo¤s than their computer opponent imi. Second, the total prot
of the sophisticated player is much lower than the total prot of the stage game Cournot
Nash equilibrium over 40 rounds or the prot a Stackelberg leader could achieve against
computer br. Hence, even sophisticated human subjects playing against imi will typically
8Vega-Redondos result has been generalized to larger classes of games by Alos-Ferrer and Ania (2005),
Possajennikov (2003), Schipper (2003) and Tanaka (1999).
9Schipper (2008) shows that if there are both imitators and bestresponse players in the game, then any
state where imitators are weakly better o¤ than bestresponse players and where best-response players play
a bestresponse is absorbing. Moreover, if mistakes are added, then in the long run imitators are strictly
better o¤ than bestresponse players. The intuition is that if imitators play a su¢ ciently large quantity,
bestresponders become Stackelberg followers.
11
earn much less than playing against other computer types. Third, since imi will never lower
its quantity q2 as long as q1 + q2 < 108, any mistake or experimentation that leads to an
increase of the human subjects quantity will result in a permanent drop of prots. Thus,
we should expect to see prots decline over time. Finally, even subjects that do not care
to maximize their absolute prots but instead aim at beating the computer (i.e. maximize
their relative payo¤), can only do so by a very modest margin of 212 (for comparison note
that a Stackelberg leader gains a prot di¤erential against a follower of 40  729 = 29 160).
3.4 Reinforcement learning (re)
In a standard model of reinforcement learning by Roth and Erev (1995), an action is chosen
with probability that is proportional to the propensity for this action. Propensities, in turn,
are simply the accumulated payo¤s from taking this action earlier in the process.
In games with a large action space such as a Cournot duopoly, it seems unreasonable
to reinforce only that single action that was chosen in a given round. Rather, actions
in the neighborhood should also be reinforced although to a lesser extent depending on
their distance to the original choice. Therefore, we complement the standard model of
reinforcement learning by updating of neighborhoods à la Sarin and Vahid (2004).
The player starts with the same initial propensity for each quantity, w1i (q). For t =
2; :::propensities are updated by10
wti(q) = max

1; wt 1i (q) + (q; q
t 1
i )(q
t 1
i ; q
t 1
 i )

;
where  is the linear Bartlett function
(q; qt 1i ) := max

0;
6  jq   qt 1i j
6

:
That is, all actions within 5 grid points of the chosen action are also reinforced.
The probability of playing quantity q in period t is computed by normalizing the propen-
sities
pti(q) =
wti(q)P
q0 w
t
i(q
0)
:
Theoretical results on the convergence properties of reinforcement learning are scarce.11
Thus most of the analysis is based on simulations. We ran several simulations of reinforce-
10We imposed a lower bound of 1 on propensities.
11Laslier, Topol, and Walliser (2001) show that reinforcement learning converges with positive probability
to any strict pure Nash equilibrium in nite two-player strategic games. Similar results were obtained by
Ianni (2002). However, they do not consider reinforcement of neighborhoods as in our case.
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ment learning against itself as well as other decision rules while varying the initial propen-
sities w1i (q). Choosing initial propensity is always a bit arbitrary. However, results did not
change much when using di¤erent initial propensities. We chose w1i (q) = 78; which mini-
mized the mean squared deviation to the Nash equilibrium. Since reinforcement learning
already is a stochastic process, we did not add additional noise to the process.
3.5 Trial & error (t&e)
Huck, Normann, and Oechssler (2004a) introduce a very simple trial & error learning
process. Players begin by randomly adjusting their initial quantity either up- or down-
wards with an exogenously xed step size. If this change increases prots, the direction is
continued. If it does not, the direction of adjustment is reversed. We chose a step size of
4. Formally, players adjust their quantities as follows:
qti := maxf0;minfqt 1i + 4st 1i ; 109gg;
for t = 2; :::, where
sti :=

sign(qti   qt 1i ) sign(ti   t 1i ) if (qti   qt 1i )(ti   t 1i ) 6= 0
+1; 1 each with positive probability otherwise. :
On the boundaries of the output grid, we chose a soft reecting boundary. In par-
ticular, when the process reached 109 or 0 twice in subsequent periods, the next quantity
chosen was 109  4 or 0 + 4; respectively.
Huck, Normann, and Oechssler (2004a) show that in Cournot duopoly if players choose
the wrong direction with small but positive probability, then trial & error learning converges
in the long run to a set of outcomes around the collusive outcome. To follow the theoretical
setting, the noise for this process was modelled such that the computer chose the opposite
direction from that prescribed by the theory with independent probability of 0.2 in each
round.12
4 Experimental design
In total, 550 subjects participated in our internet experiment. Subjects played in a location
of their own choice (home, o¢ ce etc.), and at their own pace. Recruitment was done by
12Trial & error learning can be viewed as a special operationalization of learning direction theory by
Selten and Buchta (1998). This theory assumes that players can judge in which direction better actions
can be found. In the absence of information about demand and cost conditions, one interpretation is that
the right direction can be found by determining which direction was successful last period.
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email, internet newsgroups, and a University of Bonn student magazine. Each subject
chose a nickname. Incentives were provided by publicly displaying a highscore after the
experiment (like in computer games). We did not want to exclude (and implicitly select)
subjects by technical means. In order to participate in our experiment, a standard web
browser and a low-speed internet connection were su¢ cient.
Subjects could repeat the experiment as often as they desired,13 either immediately
or at some later time. Subjects were encouraged to repeat under the same user name as
before.14 While 550 subject played the rst round (rsttimers), we recorded 500 plays
by repeaters.
The sequence of events was as follows. After logging in, subjects were matched to a
computer type. The computer type was displayed to subjects via a label (Greek letters)
though subjects were not told how computer types were associated with labels. In the
instructions (see Appendix A) subjects were told the following: The other rm is always
played by a computer program. The computer uses a xed algorithm to calculate its
output which may depend on a number of things but it cannot observe your output from
the current round before making its decision.
A page with instructions was displayed to subjects. At any time during the experiment,
subjects were able read the instructions and an example for calculating prots by open-
ing a separate window on their computer. After reading the instructions, subjects could
input their quantity for the rst round. The computer displayed a new window with the
results for the current round including the number of the round, the subjects quantity, the
subjects prot, the computers quantity as well as the computers prot (see Appendix B
for screenshots). Subjects had to acknowledge this information before moving on to the
following round. Upon acknowledgment, a new page appeared with an input eld for the
new quantity. This page also showed a table with the entire history of previous rounds
quantities and prots for both players.15
After round 40, subjects were asked to ll in a brief questionnaire (see Appendix) with
information on gender, occupation, country of origin, formal training in game theory or
economic theory, previous participation in online experiments, and the free format question
13One subject actually played a record 31 times.
14The incentives for doing so were the highscore and the possibility to pick the same computer opponent
as before (subjects logging in under a di¤erent name were allocated to a randomly chosen computer). The
latter possibility was only revealed once subjects logged in under the same name.
15See the working paper version (Duersch et al., 2005) for an additional treatment, in which subjects
were reminded only of the previous rounds results. The results did not di¤er signicantly.
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Please explain in a few words how you made your decisions. It was possible to skip this
questionnaire. The highscore was displayed on the following page. This table contained
a ranking among all previous subjects, separately for subjects who were matched against
the same computer type and for all subjects. It also contained the computers highscore.
5 Results
To give a rst impression of the data, we present in Table 2 mean quantities of subjects
and computers, respectively, averaged over all rounds and subjects. The rst thing to
notice is that subjects on average have much higher quantities than computers (48.68 vs.
33.29). This holds for all treatments except for the imitation treatment. Recall that the
CournotNash quantity is 36 (see Table 1). Thus, subjects chose on average quantities
that exceeded by far the Cournot quantity and in some cases came close to the Stackelberg
leader output of 54.
Table 2: Mean quantities
treatment
subjects
mean quantities
computers
mean quantities
br 51.99 (0.61) 27.79 (0.30)
t&e 48.96 (0.71) 32.05 (0.49)
c 46.11 (0.74) 31.94 (0.26)
imi 46.40 (0.91) 48.38 (0.49)
re 47.45 (0.83) 35.71 (0.72)
Total 48.68 (0.34) 33.92 (0.29)
Note: Average quantities over all 40 rounds and all subjects in a given treatment. The Cournot-
Nash equilibrium quantity is 36. Standard errors of means in parentheses.
5.1 How are prots a¤ected by the opponents learning algorithm?
How do subjectsprots di¤er with respect to their computer opponents? Figure 1 shows
a boxplot, which compactly summarizes the range of subjectsaverage prots per round of
rst time players and repeaters, respectively. The gure reports those measures separately
for each treatment, i.e. for each computer opponent (br, t&e, c, imi, and re). In the
boxplot, the boxes denote the interquartile range (ICR) between 75th and 25th percentiles,
i.e. 50% of observations are concentrated in this range. The line in the box denotes the
median prot. The length of the whiskers is the min of 1.5 times the ICR and the distance
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Figure 1: Boxplot of human subjectsprots against the di¤erent computer opponents (left
panel: rsttimers, right panel: repeaters).
The boxes denote the interquartile range (ICR) between 75th and 25th percentiles. The line in the
box denotes the median prot. The length of the whiskers is the min of 1.5 times the ICR and
the distance to the most extreme outcome. The dotted line shows the prot in the static Nash
equilibrium.
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to the most extreme outcome. The dotted line shows the prot per round in the Cournot
Nash equilibrium for comparison.
First time players who are matched against computer types br, t&e, or c achieve
median prots that are about equal to or slightly less than the Nash equilibrium prot.
Drastically di¤erent, however, are prots of subjects who were matched against the com-
puter types imi and re. Median prots against imi were less than half the prots against the
rst three computer types. Even the very best subjects do not reach the Nash equilibrium
prot, despite the bias in the noise of this computer type (see Footnote 7). Prots against
computer type re are also substantially lower than against br and c but they are higher
than against imi.16 The range of prots is highest against this type of computer. Some
subjects achieve very high prots that exceed the Stackelberg leader or collusive prot (of
1458).
Median prots of repeaters are generally higher than those of rst time players.17 While
subjects improve somewhat against computer type imi, median prots are still by far the
lowest of all computer types. Against br, c, and re subjects achieve higher median prots
than in the Nash equilibrium. Again, the very best subjects played against t&e and re.
It is also quite instructive to consider average prots over time. Figure 2 shows average
prots of subjects and computers for all 40 periods. Subjects playing against type br
almost immediately gain a substantive edge over the computer and keep their prots more
or less constant somewhere between the Stackelberg leader prot and the Nash equilibrium
prot. The nal result against type c is similar but convergence is much more gradual.
This shows a considerable amount of foresight on the side of our subjects. When playing
against c (in contrast to br), subjects must be more patient and forward looking to teach
the computer into a Stackelberg follower position. The ctitious play computer is also the
most successful among the computer types as it stabilizes at a prot of above 1000. The
time series against types t&e and re look similar, although against the latter subjects do
not even manage to achieve the Nash equilibrium prot on average.18
16For rst-time players, prots against re are lower than against br and c according to twosided, non
parametric MannWhitney U tests (see e.g. Siegel and Castellan, 1988) at p < 0:001: For repeaters these
di¤erences are not signicant anymore. For both, rst-timers and repeaters, prots against imi are lower
than against any other computer type at p < 0:001. A robust rank order test yields the same signicance
levels.
17Prots of those rsttimers who we could identify as subsequent repeaters were actually lower in their
rst play than those of other rsttimers although this di¤erence is not signicant. Thus, the increase in
prots shown in Figure 1 appears to be driven by experience rather than selection of subjects.
18The dip of the computers prots in round 2 is due to the high relative weight of the (uniformly
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Figure 2: Time series of prots for subjects and computers for di¤erent computer types.
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Computer type imi yields a totally di¤erent picture. In contrast to all others, it is
the only computer type where subjectspayo¤s are lower than those of computers. Fur-
thermore, subjects average prots are much lower than against other learning algorithms.
Finally, the data show that payo¤s against imi decrease over time, both for subjects and
for computers. All three results are in line with the theoretical predictions of Proposition
1.
Table 3 considers the subjects with the prots overall. Among the top 100 subjects,
there are 48 subjects who played against a computer of type re, 28 who played against type
br, and 24 who played against t&e. The top 10 players were almost exclusively playing
against type re. This conrms the impression obtained from Figure 1. The highest prots
can be achieved against type re but a lot of luck is needed for this due to the stochastic
nature of reinforcement learning.
Table 3: Distribution of top subjects
against computer type... among top 100 among top 10
br 28  
t&e 24 1
re 48 9
Note: Pooled over rst-timers and repeaters.
5.2 Human tactics
In this section we shall answer the second question raised in the introduction, namely how
can the opponents learning process be inuenced by the players behavior. One particularly
intriguing question concerns evidence for strategic teaching, i.e. strategic manipulation of
the computer types by subjects. Subjects may forgo short-term gains in order to manipulate
the programmed opponent and earn large gains in later periods.19
Since initially, rsttimers did not know the computer type, they may experiment with
di¤erent quantities in order to explore the programmed opponents responses. Table 4
reports the fraction of subjects that experiment with quantities. We call a subject ex-
distributed) initial weights in early rounds, while the computer quantity in round 1 is not chosen by the
learning theory, but set to 35, 40 or 45.
19Collusion as an outcome is theoretically possible only against computer type t&e (Huck, Normann,
and Oechssler, 2004a). However, as data on individual plays reveal, there were no successful examples of
collusion between subject and computer over a prolonged period.
19
perimenting if the standard deviation of his quantities in the rst 10 rounds is at least
twice the standard deviation in the last 30 rounds. Overall at least one quarter of the
rst-time subjects experiment with quantities in this sense. The fraction exceeds 40% for
ctitious play and trial & error learning. Note that these two are the slowest moving
computer types. Table 4 also reports the fraction of repeaters who experiment. Interest-
ingly, exploration declines when subjects play repeatedly except for reinforcement learning.
So for all learning theories except reinforcement learning, exploration of rst-timers may
yield information that is used when the experiment is repeated. There may be two reasons
for why it is di¤erent for reinforcement learning. First, note that reinforcement learning
involves a probabilistic choice rule and may appear quite erratic to subjects. Therefore
it may take more e¤ort to learn about reinforcement learning than about other computer
types. Second, as we have seen in previous sections, with some luck subjects can earn large
prots if reinforcement starts with low quantities. Subjectsexperimentation in the rst
10 rounds may be aimed exactly at this.
Table 4: Classication of tactics
against computer type... tactic rst-timer repeater
br Experimentation 25% 18%
Leadership 20% 32%
c Experimentation 41% 29%
Leadership 14% 11%
re Experimentation 25% 32%
Leadership 16% 16%
imi Experimentation 31% 25%
Leadership 16% 15%
t&e Experimentation 40% 18%
Leadership 16% 28%
Once subjects have explored and learned about the computer type, they may use this
information to actively manipulate the computer type. Such manipulations may take
on various forms. Probably the most straightforward form of manipulation is aimed at
achieving Stackelberg leadership through aggressive play of large quantities. Table 4 also
reports the fraction of subjects with such leadership behavior. We dene a subject as
displaying leadership behavior if he chooses a quantity of least 50 for at least 36 out of
40 rounds. About 16% of the rst-timers display such leadership behavior. When playing
against best response or trial & error learning, this behavior becomes even more pronounced
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among repeaters. The increase in leadership behavior is most remarkable when subjects
play against br. Indeed, playing aggressively is a quite successful manipulation of br.
Figure 3(a) shows quantities of the most successful subject playing against br and the
corresponding computer quantities. This subject (ranked overall 45th) chose 55 in all 40
periods.20 The computer quickly adjusted to a neighborhood of the Stackelberg follower
quantity with the remaining movement due to the noise in the computers decision rule.
While leadership may be a relatively simple form of strategic manipulation, individual
data reveal manipulations that can be very sophisticated. We discovered quite interesting,
though not very frequent, patterns that can be seen in Figure 3(b). The subject who
played against best response chose with only slight variations the following cycle of 4
quantities: 108, 70, 54, 42, 108, 70, ... Stunningly, this cycle produces an expected prot
per round of 1520, which exceeds the Stackelberg leader prot.21 By ooding the market
with a quantity of 108, the subject made sure that the computer left the market in the next
period. But instead of going for the monopoly prot, the subject accumulated intermediate
prots over three periods. This, of course, raises the question, whether a cycle is optimal
and how the optimal cycle looks like. It turns out, that in this game a cycle of length is
four is optimal and, after rounding to integers, the optimal cycle is 108, 68, 54, 41, which
produces an expected prot of 1522.22 Thus, our subject was within 2 units of the solution
for this nontrivial optimization problem.23
How did the very best subject play? Like all top players, he played against computer
type re. Figure 3(c) reveals that the subject simply got lucky. The reinforcement algorithm
locked in at very low quantities in the range between 10 and 20, and the subject roughly
played a best response to that, which resulted in an average prot of 2091.
One benchmark to compare the behavior of our subjects to is the maximal prot an
omniscient, myopic player could achieve against the respective learning theory. To generate
this benchmark, we ran simulations pitting our 5 computer types against a simulated player
who can perfectly forecast the action his computer opponent is about to take (including the
noise) and plays a best response to that, but disregards the inuence of his action on the
future behavior of his opponent. As Figure 4 shows, our repeater subjects outperform that
20Curiously, none of our subjects chose the exact Stackelberg leader quantity of 54.
21The only reason the subject in Figure 3(a) received an even higher payo¤ was luck due to favorable
noise of the computer algorithm.
22See Schipper (2006) for a proof of this claim.
23The subject played three times against br and left two comments. The rst was tried to trick him,
the second tricked him.
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Figure 3: (a) Quantities of subject ranked number 45 and of the br-computer opponent
(top panel); (b) Quantities of subject ranked number 49 and of the br-computer opponent
(middle panel); (c) Quantities of top-ranked subject and his re-computer opponent
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benchmark against br, re, and t&e. They do worse than the benchmark against ctitious
play but considerably worse only against imitate the best. Given that the myopic best
behavior requires a huge amount of knowledge about the opponent, which our subjects can
not possibly possess since each learning theory incorporates a random element, the only
way for subjects to match or outperform the best myopic benchmark is by playing more
sophisticated than myopic by inuencing future play of the learning theories.
6 The role of incentives: a robustness check
In the main (internet) experiment, the only incentive for subject was the highscore. It
is a justied question whether these incentives are strong enough compared to the usual
nancial incentives given in laboratory experiments. To check for this, we conducted a
control experiment as a regular laboratory experiment with the usual monetary incentives.
In the lab experiment, 50 subjects played in the Bonn Laboratory for Experimental Eco-
nomics. The instructions and the computer interface for both settings were the same up
to the incentive structure. Subjects were required to repeat the experiment once with the
same computer type as opponent, i.e., they played two times 40 rounds. Since there were
fewer observations in the lab, we used only a starting value of 40 for the computer types.24
Incentives were provided by paying subjects immediately at the end of the experiment the
sum of prots over all rounds according to an exchange rate of 9000 Points to 1 euro. On
average, subjects earned 10.17 euro for about half an hour in the lab.
We do nd some signicant di¤erences between the two incentive structures. In the
lab experiment, average quantities are signicantly lower (MWUtest, p < 0:01) although
average prots do not signicantly di¤er.25 However, the crucial point is whether the di¤er-
ences across our treatments are robust to changing the incentive structure. The left panel
of Figure 5 shows average prots of all subjects given their respective computer opponent.
The only signicant di¤erence between the lab and the internet is for computer opponent
imi (MWUtest, p < 0:05). More importantly, all treatment e¤ects are qualitatively the
same, independently of the incentive structure.26 The right panel of Figure 5 shows the
24Recall that in the internet experiment, computer algorithms had an equal chance of starting with values
35, 40 or 45.
25Both results hold for all subjects and for rsttimers only. All tests in this Section can also be conducted
as Kolmogorov-Smirnov tests without changing the results. For additional tables with data for each learning
algorithm see the working paper version (Duersch, Kolb, Oechssler, and Schipper, 2008).
26Likewise, when we recalculate Tables 3 and 4 by including data from the lab, only very minor changes
occur.
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Figure 4: Average prots per round of simulated omniscient, myopic player (white bars) vs.
actual prots of repeaters (black bars) and rst-time subjects (grey bars) when matched
against the di¤erent computer types (e.g. re repeat is the average prot of repeaters
against computer re, re simulation is average prot of the omniscient player against re.
Note: The omniscient player can perfectly predict the computers action (including noise).
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Figure 5: A comparison of the internet experiment (net) and the laboratory (lab). (a) Left
panel: Mean prots of human subjects against their respective computer opponents. (b)
Right panel: Mean di¤erence between the subjects prot and the computers prot.
Note: ** signicant di¤erence at the 1% level ; * signicant di¤erence at 5% level, MWUtests.
average di¤erence of the subjects prot and the computers prot. The main result, that
human subjects manage to exploit all of their computer opponents except imi, holds for
both incentive structures. The average prot di¤erential is signicantly larger than 0 for
computer opponents br, c, re, and t&e and for both incentive structures, net and lab.27
The prot di¤erential against imi is signicantly smaller than 0 for both incentive struc-
tures at the 1% level. Furthermore, testing across incentive structures, prot di¤erentials
against br, re, and imi are not signicantly di¤erent between net and lab. Prot di¤er-
entials against c and t&e are signicantly larger in net but, qualitatively, the treatment
e¤ects seem to be robust.
27According to ttests at the 1% level with the exception of t&e in lab for which the di¤erential is only
marginally larger at the 10% level. Results for a Wilcoxon test are qualitatively the same.
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7 Conclusion
In this experiment we let subjects play against computers which were programmed to
follow one out of a set of popular learning theories. The aim was to nd out whether
subjects were able to exploit those learning algorithms. We nd that there are remarkable
di¤erences in the exploitability of myopic learning algorithms. There are two insights
from this observation: First, while the bulk of traditional learning theories that have been
studied in the literature are myopic in nature, we need more advanced learning theories
that incorporate at least a limited amount of foresight if those learning theories should also
t subjects engaged in strategic teaching. Many of our subjects were quite able to exploit
the simple myopic learning algorithms. Strategic teaching is an important phenomenon
that needs to be accounted for in the future development of theory.
Second, from an evolutionary perspective, one desideratum to impose on a realistic
learning theory should be its non-exploitability. If a learning theory can be exploited by
sophisticated subjects to their advantage, then such a learning theory should disappear
in the long run. Interestingly, we nd that among the learning algorithms studied in this
paper, only imitate-the-best is robust to exploitation. This learning algorithm is known to
lead to a non-Nash equilibrium in the game studied. This observation poses the following
theoretical question left for further research: Does there exist a simple adaptive learning
algorithm that is not exploitable and leads to Nash equilibrium?
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Appendix
A Proof of Proposition 1
Proof. Let the computer be player 2. We rst claim that imi will imitate player 1s
quantity from the previous round if and only if it is closer to 54 than its own quantity and
q1+q2 6= 108: For q1+q2 = 108, both prots are zero and imi sticks to its own strategy. For
q1+ q2 6= 108, we need to show that (q1; q2) > (q2; q1) if and only if jq1   54j < jq2   54j.
For q1+q2 < 108 or for q1; q2 > 54, the claim follows because for p > c (p < c) the rm with
higher (lower) quantity makes the larger prot (the smaller loss). It remains to consider
the case qi > 54 > q i but q1 + q2 > 108: In this case
jqi   54j = qi   54 > 54  q i = jq i   54j :
Since p < c, both rms make losses and since qi > q i, rm is losses are larger, which
proves the claim. Note in particular, that as long as q1 + q2 < 108, imi will never lower its
quantity q2.
(a) Since quantities are strategic substitutes, the above claim implies that for starting
values of the computer higher than the Cournot quantity, q12 > 36, player 1 is best o¤ by
not triggering imi to choose higher quantities than q12. Thus, imi will continue to play q
1
2
and player 1s optimal strategy is to play a myopic best reply q1 2 br(q12) every period.
The resulting prots for the human player over 40 rounds are maxq1 (q1; 40) = 46 240 and
maxq1 (q1; 45) = 39 680. The resulting prots for computer imi are (40; q1) = 54 440 and
(45; q1) = 57 600.
If q12 = 35, player 1s optimal strategy is to play q
t
1 = q
1
2; for all t = 1; :::; 39 and
q401 2 br(q12). This results in a prot of 53 202. The imi computers prot is 53 165 in
this case. Since the three starting values 35, 40, and 45 occur with the same frequency,
the average prot for the player from this optimal strategy is 46 374, while his computer
opponent imi earns 55068.
(b) Given a starting value q12 of the computer, the player can obtain a positive prot
di¤erential in a given round t if and only if
qt1   54 < qt2   54 : Unless the player changes
his strategy again, this prot di¤erential is eroded in the next period due to the adjustment
of imi to the quantity that yielded the higher prot. The player can close the gap to 54 in
one large step or in several small steps. Due to the linear structure of the Cournot game,
the number of steps does not matter. To see this note that the prot di¤erential for one
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step is given by (p   1)(q1   q12). For starting values of imi below 54, this expression is
maximized by q1 = 54. Now suppose the player takes two arbitrary steps in rounds 1 and
2 to reach 54 (for all rounds thereafter the prot di¤erential is zero). The prot di¤erential
is then given by
(p1   1)(q11   q12) + (p2   1)(q21   q22): (5)
Since imi always imitates quantities that are closer to 54, we have that q22 = q
1
1: Thus, (5)
is maximized by q21 = 54 and arbitrary q
1
1 such that q
1
2  q11  54. Consequently, the prot
di¤erential is the same with one or two steps. The same argument holds for any number
of steps towards 54.
The maximal prot di¤erentials that can be obtained for the three starting values
35, 40, and 45 are therefore 361, 196, and 81, respectively, which yield an average prot
di¤erential of 212.67.
B Instructions
B.1 Introduction Page
Welcome to our experiment!
Please take your time to read this short introduction. The experiment lasts for 40 rounds. At
the end, there is a high score showing the rankings of all participants. You represent a rm which
produces and sells a certain product. There is one other rm that produces and sells the same
product. You must decide how much to produce in each round. The capacity of your factory allows
you to produce between 0 and 110 units each round. Production costs are 1 per unit. The price you
obtain for each sold unit may vary between 0 and 109 and is determined as follows. The higher the
combined output of you and the other rm, the lower the price. To be precise, the price falls by 1
for each additional unit supplied. The prot you make per unit equals the price minus production
cost of 1. Note that you make a loss if the price is 0. Your prot in a given round equals the prot
per unit times your output, i.e. prot = (price - 1) * Your output. Please look for an example
here. At the beginning of each round, all prior decisions and prots are shown. The other rm is
always played by a computer program. The computer uses a xed algorithm to calculate its output
which may depend on a number of things but it cannot observe your output from the current round
before making its decision. Your prots from all 40 rounds will be added up to calculate your high
score. There is an overall high score and a separate one for each type of computer. Please do not
use the browser buttons (back, forward) during the game, and do not click twice on the go button,
it may take a short while.
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Choose new quantity
Please choose an integer (whole number) between 0 and 110.
B.2 Example Page
The Formula
The prot in each round is calculated according to the following formula:
Prot = (Price   1) * Your Output
The price, in turn, is calculated as follows.
Price = 109   Combined Output
That is, if either you or the computer raises the output by 1, the price falls by 1 for both of
you. (but note that the price cannot become negative). And the combined output is simply:
Combined Output = Your Output + Computers Output
Example:
Lets say your output is 20, and the computers output is 40. Hence, combined output is 60
and the price would be 49 (= 109  60). Your prot would be (49  1)  20 = 960. The com-
puters prot would be (49  1)  40 = 1920. Now assume you raise your output to 30, while
the computer stays at 40. The new price would be 39 (= 109  40  30). Your prot would be
(39  1)  30 = 1140. The computers prot would be (39  1)  40 = 1520.
To continue, please close this window.
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II. Taking Punishment Into Your Own Hands: An
Experiment on the Motivation Underlying
Punishment∗
Abstract
In a punishment experiment, we separate the demand for punishment in gen-
eral from a possible demand to conduct punishment personally. Subjects expe-
rience an unfair split of their earnings from a real effort task and have to decide
on the punishment of the person who determines the distribution. First, it is
established whether the allocator’s payoff is reduced and, afterwards, subjects
take part in a second price auction for the right to (physically) carry out the
act of payoff reduction. This auction only resolves who will punish, not whether
punishment takes place, so only subjects with a demand for personal punishment
should bid.
∗Paper co-authored by Julia Mueller.
If the person who had done us some great injury, who had murdered our
father or our brother, for example, should soon afterwards die of a fever, or
even be brought to the scaffold upon account of some other crime, though it
might sooth our hatred, it would not fully gratify our resentment. Resent-
ment would prompt us to desire, not only that he should be punished, but
that he should be punished by our means, and upon account of that particular
injury which he had done to us. (Adam Smith1)
1 Introduction
The desire for revenge, to punish those who did wrong upon oneself, is a strong moti-
vation for humans. From ancient Greek dramas to modern movies, hardly a storyline
can do without. It has also been the focus of extensive research in economics, both in
the form of experiments which find that, indeed, subjects are willing to forgo monetary
gains to exert punishment, and in the form of theoretical models that seek to explain
such behavior. However, both the quote by Adam Smith above and several of those
movies2 feature a very specific observation about punishment: According to Adam
Smith, humans not only care about punishment being inflicted on the perpetrator of
a crime against them, but they also value carrying out that punishment themselves,
personally. It is this, personal, characteristic of punishment that we try to isolate in
the laboratory. Our experiment is designed to exclude other possible reasons why one
would be willing to give up money to punish, e.g. subjects do not have to spend money
to assure punishment is carried out, they only spend money to assure it is carried out
by them personally.
Punishment has been documented in various experiments, especially in social dilemma
situations where individual and group incentives diverge and free-riding occurs. One of
the first experiments of this kind was conducted by Ostrom et al. (1992), where subjects
who played various rounds in a common pool resource game were willing to pay a fee
to place a fine on other subjects who over-extracted the resource. Fehr and Ga¨chter
(2000) demonstrate that costly punishment of free-riders who do not contribute occurs
in a public goods experiment, with punishment leading to higher levels of coopera-
tion. Nikiforakis and Normann (2008) analyze the effectiveness of such peer-imposed
punishment in a public good game, finding that contributions increase in the effective-
ness. In contrast, Falkinger et al. (2000) use punishment imposed “automatically” by
the experimenter on non-contributers. Both peer-imposed and experimenter-imposed
1In The Theory of Moral Sentiments, page 113.
2E.g. Marsellus telling Butch to move aside, so he can shoot Zed in Pulp Fiction, or Grace shooting
Tom herself in Dogville, “Some things, you have to do yourself”.
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punishment raises contributions. However, subjects are not only motivated by the mon-
etary consequences of punishment. As Masclet et al. (2003) show, even non-monetary
punishment, the expression of disapproval by others, leads to the same result. Masclet
et al. (2003) are mainly interested in the receiving side of the punishment, but, it is
also interesting to investigate the decision process of the punishing side.
Direct neuroeconomic evidence that subjects “like” to punish was found by De Quer-
vain et al. (2004). They used PET recordings of brain activation to investigate the
mechanisms in the brain involved in punishment. Subjects played a trust game where
cooperating players could punish defecting partners. In the punishment condition acti-
vation of the dorsal striatum was found, which is well known for its reward processing
properties. This could either be due to the fact that the defecting partner lost money
or it could be pleasure derived from the act of punishing. Based on their finding that
subjects do not condition the amount of their own punishment onto the punishment
already dealt (to the same person) by other subjects, Casari and Luini (2009), speculate
that in the same vein that “the punisher derives her utility from the act of punishment
in itself and not from achieving, in conjunction with other punishers, a total amount of
punishment.”
Spurred on by the experimental observation that people do not always act purely
selfish, new theories of other-regarding preferences have been put forward, capturing
phenomena like fairness, altruism, inequity aversion. Levine (1998) uses an adjusted
utility which is supplemented by a term which takes into account the opponent’s utility
weighted by an altruism coefficient. Inequity aversion models add to the utility derived
from own income a term that represents concern about the payoff distribution; Fehr
and Schmidt (1999) use the difference between subjects own payoff and the payoffs of
the opponents, Bolton and Ockenfels (2000) the proportion of total payoffs.
Other theories develop techniques to embed concerns for reciprocity. Rabin (1993)
models reciprocity in normal form games by adding psychological payoffs to the material
payoffs. This additional term captures intentions via beliefs of the players and defines
the kindness of players in relation to his possible actions. Dufwenberg and Kirchsteiger
(2004) dilate this approach to sequential games. Falk and Fischbacher (2006) also
transform standard games into psychological games. In their model, utility of the
players depends not only on the payoffs but also on a reciprocity term which embodies
kindness and reciprocation.
All of these theories incorporate the opponent’s outcome into the utility of the
player, and several can explain reciprocal behavior or punishment. However, we are not
primarily interested in the fact that the payoff of an offender is reduced, but especially
in who will derive satisfaction from punishing. Only the person who conducted the
punishment? Or everyone who saw the offender being punished, even if the punishment
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was not conducted “personally”?
Perhaps the theory closest to our design is the paper by Andreoni (1990). He
examines private provision of a public good and models the utility of the individuals
as a function not only of the amount of the public good but also of the own gift to the
public good. This individual donation produces what Andreoni calls a “warm glow”,
utility derived from the act of giving. If one assumes in almost the same manner that
the act of punishing enters the utility function, one would arrive at a theory that could
account for a demand to punish personally.
In the next section, we introduce the design we use to investigate personal punish-
ment. In section 3 we explain the theoretical solutions, then in section 4 our hypotheses
and in section 5 we present our results. In section 6 we introduce our control experiment.
Finally in section 7, we conclude with a discussion.
2 Experiment
2.1 Design
To test the demand for personal punishment, we use a design with four stages. Subjects
are matched in groups of four; each group consists of three subjects A and one subject
B. The experiment was anonymous, so no subject knew about the other subjects he or
she was matched with.
Instructions for the experiment, which fully described the experiment for both type
A and type B, were handed to subjects at the very start of the experiment, followed by
test questions to check whether the subjects had understood the instructions.3 Only
when all subjects had correctly answered these questions, did the experiment proceed.
-
Instructions Test
Questions
Q 1 Stage 1 - 4 Destroy Q 2 Payment

HHHHHHH
Real
Effort
Division
by B
Decision
by A’s
Auction
Figure 1: Timing
3See appendix A.1 and A.4 for translated instructions and test questions.
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In the first stage, all subjects A participated in a real effort task where they could
earn EUR 10. They were asked to fill a sheet of graph paper (A5, 148 × 210 mm,
about 1260 squares) with alternating o and + signs. The allocated time frame was 25
minutes. Subjects who did not finish the task in time did drop out of the experiment
and received no money apart from the show up fee. We chose this particular task for
two reasons: First, it is simple and does not require any special abilities, so all subjects
should be equally fit for the task. Second, as we found out in previous tests, the task
is considerably more exhausting than it appears. We wanted to induce a feeling of
ownership in those subjects who completed it. On the other hand, it was to look easy
to the non-participating subjects B. During the task, all B’s were sitting in the same
room as the A’s, but without any assignment.
After the task, the experimenters collected the sheets and informed each B how
many A’s in her group had succeeded. Upon learning that information, in stage two,
B had to decide on an allocation of the money earned by the A’s in the previous stage.
The only two allocations available were (2,8): EUR 2 for A, EUR 8 for B, or (10,0):
EUR 10 for A, EUR 0 for B. B could only implement the same allocation for all three
A’s she was matched with, not different allocations for different A’s. So in the case of
three successful A’s subject B had to decide between EUR 24 for herself and EUR 2 for
each A or EUR 0 for herself and EUR 10 for each A.
Before stage three, the experimenters informed all A’s about the decision of their
matched B. The money that B allocated to A was handed to A. The money that B
allocated to herself was also handed to A, however it was put in an envelope by the
experimenters. Then all A’s had to decide whether they wanted to reduce B’s payoff
by destroying one of the three envelopes designated for B. If all A’s decided not to
reduce, the envelopes were collected by the experimenters, handed to B and stage four
did not take place.
If at least one A decided to reduce, the entire group entered stage four. Here, all
A’s of the group took part in a sealed bid second price auction. The highest bidder
won the right to destroy the envelope lying in front of him. Only the envelope of the
winner was destroyed.4 Note that B’s payoff depends entirely on stages 1 to 3. The
auction only selected the A who would be allowed to destroy the envelope, it did not
affect B’s payoff. The auction provides a non-arbitrary way to separate the decision
to punish from the decision to punish personally. Since, in a second price auction, no
participant has a reason to misrepresent his preferences, subjects are incentivized to
truthfully state the value they attach to personal punishment.
4The minimum feasible bid was zero, the maximum feasible bid 10 and the step size 0.01. If there
was a tie, the experimenters randomly chose a winner. This also applies to the special case of all three
A’s choosing a bid of zero.
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The auction winner was informed about the second highest bid he had to pay. He
could then proceed to destroy the envelope of B. The instructions did not specify any
mode of destruction; however a small metal bin was present on the tables of each subject
A. Additionally the experimenters placed a lighter inside the metal bin.5 The envelopes
in front of the non-winning A’s were collected by the experimenters and delivered to
the respective B’s.
Between the test questions and the real effort task we asked some demographics
from our subjects and two questions about their happiness (“how happy are you in
general”/“how happy are you right now”). After stage four and before paying, we pre-
sented subjects with a second questionnaire asking their happiness again (only “how
happy are you right now”), their perception of B’s behavior and several attitude ques-
tions (see Appendix A.5). All subjects received a EUR 8 “show up fee” for answering
the questionnaires. If a subject A had won the auction and had to pay more money
than he earned in the experiment, he had to use a part of those EUR 8 to pay for his
bid.
2.2 Procedures
The experiment was conducted in October 2008 in the laboratory of SFB 504 in
Mannheim. We had 76 subjects in total (37% male, 63% female), who were students
of various fields at University of Mannheim. The experiment consisted of four sessions;
no subject participated twice. All recruitment was done via ORSEE (Greiner (2004)).
In total, the experiment lasted for about 1.5h, for which we paid an average of
EUR 13.84. The full experiment was conducted via pen and paper. During the exper-
iment, we used an experimental currency unit called “Thaler”. Thaler were a printed
play money handed to subjects during stages 2-7. At the end of the experiment, we
exchanged all Thaler into Euro at a rate of 1:1.6 All subjects were paid in cash and
private.
3 Theoretical solutions
Before we present the results, we examine the game theoretic predictions of the classic
fully selfish model and of the inequity aversion model by Fehr and Schmidt (1999) (as
5The subjects chose different methods to “destroy”: Most ripped the envelope apart and deposited
the pieces inside the metal bin. Some used their pen to cross out the envelope or wrote “destroyed”
onto it. One subject used the lighter to burn the envelope inside the metal bin.
6The main reason for using play money was that we did not want subjects to worry about destroying
legal tender.
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an easy to calculate example of social preference models).
For the subgame perfect equilibrium in the classic model, rational A’s could either
not bid in the last stage, or, since they play a second price auction, coordinate on having
just one A bid, while all others bid zero. However, not bidding is weakly dominant. In
stage 3 A is indifferent between yes and no, as A’s payoff is not affected by the decision.
To simplify the analysis of B’s decision we assume that at least two assigned A’s finish
stage one.7 Given that the maximal possible punishment is EUR 8, B has a strictly
dominant strategy of implementing (2, 8), because her payoff is positive compared with
the payoff of zero in case of (10, 0). A’s behavior in the first stage depends on the
monetary equivalent of the effort A needs to exert to fill out the sheet. If the equivalent
is below EUR 2, A strictly prefers to work.
If we assume our subjects have Fehr/Schmidt type preferences, the behavior in the
last stage would be equivalent to the selfish model. In stage three, subjects would
now chose yes after a (2, 8) split by B and be indifferent after (10, 0) split. For the
typical values8 Fehr and Schmidt estimated in their paper B would still decide on (2, 8).
During the real effort stage, more A’s could now prefer not to work, if their parameter
for disadvantageous inequality aversion was sufficiently high.
Behavior under the two models differs slightly in the first three stages, but in both
we get the same result for the auction stage: Bidding by at most one A per group can
only exist as part of unreasonable coordination equilibria and is weakly dominated by
not bidding.
4 Hypotheses
We have the following three hypotheses to test.
Hypothesis 1 (Punishment) Subjects A who receive the (2, 8) split want the
auction to happen.
Negative reciprocity induces subjects A who experienced the bad split to reduce
B’s payoff. Similarly, if we assume Fehr/Schmidt type preferences subjects should also
want to reduce B’s payoff. Since B’s payoff is automatically reduced if stage 4, that is
the auction, occurs, we derive hypothesis 1.
Hypothesis 2 (Personal punishment)
(2a) Subjects A who receive the (2, 8) split bid positive amounts in the auction.
7In the experiment all subjects A completed the real effort task (compare section 5).
8See table III in Fehr and Schmidt (1999).
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Bid 0 > 0 Avg.(SE) Max
Wanted punishment 55% 45% .66 (.27) 5.5
Did not want punishment 73% 27% .44 (.23) 3.2
Total 63% 37% .58 (.19) 5.5
Note: Only subjects A who encountered the (2, 8)-split.
Table 1: Bids
(2b) Subjects A never bid positive amounts in the auction.
Both the classic and social preference theories predict that subjects should not
care about the way in which B’s payoff is reduced. On the other hand, following
the reasoning put forward by Adam Smith, we could expect subjects do care about
punishing personally, so we get a two-way hypothesis about behavior of the person that
will punish in the auction.
Hypothesis 3 (Happiness) Subjects A who punish personally are happier than
those who do not.
Connected to hypothesis 2b we would also expect those subjects who punish per-
sonally to have some emotional payoff from doing so that makes their monetary loss
worthwhile.
5 Results
All participating subjects A earned EUR 10 in the real effort task: No subject decided
not to work and all finished in time. In the allocation decision by subjects B, 16 out
of 19 B implemented the (2, 8) split, only 3 the (10, 0) split. Since we are interested in
subjects with a reason to punish, we look at the 48 subjects A who were matched with
a B who chose the unfair split to test hypothesis 1. Following the (2, 8) split, 58.3% of
the subjects want to punish, that is, want the auction to happen. After a (10, 0) split,
it is demanded by only 11.1%, this is a significant difference (MW test at 0.05 level).
Therefore, we affirm hypothesis 1, our subjects are seeking punishment after receiving
the worse of the two allocations.
Since it is sufficient that one subject A out of the three matched to a particular B
demands punishment for the auction to happen, 15 out of 16 groups where B chose
(2,8) proceeded to this stage.9 Table 1 shows the percentage of subjects A who bid a
9One group out of three where (10,0) was chosen also went to the auction.
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positive amount in the ensuing auction - split into those who demanded punishment in
the previous stage and those who did not. Recall that the auction is not payoff relevant
for subject B. The payoff of B is fully determined by stages one to three. Subjects A
who are either strict money maximizers or only interested in the monetary consequences
of punishment for B have no incentive to bid higher than zero. In contrast to that,
we find that 2/5th of our subjects bid positive amounts of money. So with respect
to hypothesis 2a, we can conclude that at least a substantial minority of subjects is
interested enough in punishing personally to be willing to sacrifice some of their own
money to achieve this.
Figure 2: Cumulative distribution of bids
The cumulative distribution of bids in figure 2 shows that several subjects bid the
minimum positive value of EUR 0.01, with expected jumps at focal points like EUR 0.5.
The highest bid was EUR 5.5, EUR 2 was the highest price paid by any winner of the
second price auction.
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Surprisingly, those A who did not demand punishment in the previous stage also
bid in the auction. 44.8% of the subjects who wanted the auction bid positive amounts
compared to 27.3% of the subjects who did not want the auction. Howewer, the differ-
ence is not significant according to a MW test.10 The puzzle can be partly explained
by the fact that we offered subjects only a fixed amount of punishment, so it is possible
that some subjects who did not demand the auction wanted punishment in general, but
did not agree with our level of punishment.
Finally, we look at the result of the physical destruction carried out by the winners
of the auction. Do they enjoy the act of destroying B’s money? We ask all participants
for their subjective happiness on a seven point scale11 at the start and at the end of
the experiment. While the absolute level might depend on a number of causes we
can not control, we can use the difference in happiness between the start and end of
the experiment. Let the happiness difference be the amount of happiness reported
at the end of our experiment minus the amount reported at the start. So subjects
with a positive happiness difference felt better after our experiment than before. Not
surprisingly, subjects A who encountered the allocation (10,0) felt happier compared
to those who received only EUR 2. However, there is also a difference within those who
were matched with a subject B who chose (2,8). Such A’s who went on to win the
auction have a small but positive happiness difference of on average 0.33, while it is
-0.23 for those who did not win. That difference is significant on the 5% level (MW
test). So despite being paid less money in the end, subjects who personally destroyed
B’s money leave the experiment happier that those who do not, in line with hypothesis
3.
While a “demand for personal punishment” can explain our results, there are poten-
tially other explanations. One worry is that subjects might bid in the auction simply
because they like the act of destroying the experimental money, irrelevant of the owner.
To account for this, the final questionnaire included the question “Do you like de-
stroying money?”. Not one of our subjects answered with yes. Additionally, we gave
subjects the opportunity to destroy some of their own remaining money during the
final questionnaire. Again, none took this opportunity. Subjects might also want to
use the destruction of the money as a signal of their own toughness. However, seats
in the experiment were separated by blinds. Most of our subjects chose non-dramatic
methods of destruction that would have been hard to notice by others. Since subjects
were randomly matched, it was impossible to send a signal about ones own personality
specifically to B.
10We also ran probit regressions for the decision to punish and bidding a positive amount, but we
find our demographics and questionnaire data mostly unsignificant.
11See appendix A.5 for the translated questionnaires.
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Yet, our findings of positive bids, of increased happiness among subjects who de-
stroyed money and of the irrelevance of B’s character traits for the amount of the bid
could also be due to a desire to win auctions. To test for this possibility, we conduct a
control treatment that keeps the auction format (stage 4 of the experiment described
in section 2.1), but removes the punishment aspect. In both the experiment and the
control treatment, subjects had to correctly answer test questions about the logic of a
second prize auction before the experiment proceeded.12
6 Control treatment
6.1 Design
We designed the control experiment to duplicate the auction, but exclude the motivation
of personal punishment. Separating the auction stage from the rest of our experiment,
we had to insure that the conditions for our subjects remain comparable. We conducted
the control subsequent to another, unrelated and about 1 hour long, experiment, where
the subjects earned on average EUR 10.60.13 This money was used to pay for bids in the
control auction. After the end of the other experiment, we distributed the instructions
for the control. Instructions and test questions were as close as possible to those in the
main experiment.14
Subjects were placed in groups of three (corresponding to our group size of three
A, who did participate in the auction), then took part in a second price auction. No
subject knew the identity of the other members of the group. The highest bidder won
the right to destroy an envelope lying in front of him. We handed out envelopes to
all participating subjects before the bidding. In condition full, the envelops contained
“Thaler”. These “Thaler” were not used as an experimental currency, so for our subjects
they were just play money or pieces of paper. The instructions stated that the auction
was only for the right to destroy the envelope. However, some subjects might still have
reasoned that the auction winner could keep the contents of the envelope. Therefore,
in condition empty, we used empty envelopes instead. Feasible bids and step size were
the same as in the main experiment. Only the envelope of the winner was destroyed,
all others were collected by the experimenters.
The auction winner was informed about the second highest bid he had to pay. He
could then destroy the envelope. At the end of the control experiment, subjects were
12See appendix A.5 for the translated test questions.
13This is close to the average earnings of EUR 11.26 that subjects of type A had accumulated in the
main experiment before the auction was conducted.
14The control instructions correspond to stage 6-8 of the main experiment, see appendix.
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Bid 0 > 0 Avg.(SD) Max
Wanted punishment 55% 45% .66 (.27) 5.5
Did not want punishment 73% 27% .44 (.23) 3.2
Total Experiment 63% 37% .58 (.19) 5.5
Control full 50% 50% .45 (.36) 6.5
Control empty 46.7% 53.3% .92 (.53) 6
Total control 48.5% 51.5% .67 (.31) 6.5
Table 2: Bids control
paid privately and in cash their earnings from the prior experiment. Auction winners
were paid what they earned in the prior experiment minus the second highest bid in
their group.
6.2 Procedures
The experiment was conducted in June 2009 in the laboratory of SFB 504 in Mannheim.
In total 33 subjects participated (18 in condition full, 15 in condition empty), mostly
students of various fields at University of Mannheim. The control consisted of three
sessions; no subject participated in more than one session of either main experiment or
control. All recruitment was done via ORSEE (Greiner (2004)).
6.3 Results
In the control, about half of our subjects bid positive amounts. While the average bid
is higher in the treatment with empty envelopes, the difference between the two control
treatments is not significant (M-W test, p=0.428 two-sided). Therefore, we pool the
data. Figure 3 compares the distribution of bids the main experiment and control. The
higher frequency of positive bids in the control is mainly due to more subjects bidding
very small positive amounts. When we compare the average bid over all subjects who
take part in the auction, we find no significant difference between the pooled control
and the main treatment (M-W test, p=0.327 two-sided).
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Figure 3: Cumulative distribution of bids by treatment
7 Discussion
In an experiment designed to separate the decision to punish personally from the more
general decision to punish, we find that many subjects bid positive amounts in a second
price auction that auctions off the right to punish personally. Some of these subjects bid
substantial amounts. Consistent with positive bids, subjects who win that right report
becoming happier during the experiment compared to those who do not win. While
subjects punish more often based on their perception of the matched other player, the
decision to bid in the auction seems to be determined only by personal character traits,
not the perception of the other.
The positive bids are not due to a desire to destroy money in general. Neither can
they easily be explained as being signals and we try to reduce subject’s confusion as
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much as possible and test their understanding of a second price auction. However, our
control treatment points out a second possible explanation for subjects bidding money:
a “desire to win” the auction. There are some experimental papers that have looked at
the issue whether winning an auction has a value in itself (apart from the value of the
auctioned object), with divergent results. Holt and Sherman (1994) let subjects play
auctions against computerized opponents in treatments which facilitate a “winner’s
curse” an opposing “loser’s curse” and a balanced treatment, which they use to identify
a desire to win (since in this treatment, no informational bias should occur). They do
not find such behavior among their subjects. On the other hand, Ku et al. (2005) use
data from real life and Internet auctions and a laboratory experiment with sequential
bidding auctions to show that bidding behavior is consistent with models of escalation
or competitive arousal, which could explain a desire to win. Closest to our control
treatment is a study by van den Bos et al. (2008). In this experiment, subjects bid
in a sealed bid first price auction. In one treatment, the opponents are other human
subjects (similar to our control treatment), while in two other treatments, subjects
bid against computerized agents. Furthermore, all subjects are taught to calculate the
(risk-neutral) Nash-equilibrium strategy, to rule out a winner’s curse effect stemming
from limited cognitive ability. They find that subjects playing against humans overbid
significantly more often than those playing against computers. There is also evidence
from a fMRI experiment by Delgado et al. (2008) who compare subjects’ reactions to
losing a lottery versus losing an auction to conclude that “The fear of losing the social
competition inherent in an auction may lead people to pay too high a price for the good
for sale”. It is possible that, in a similar vein, our subjects did not want to “lose” the
auction and therefore bid positive amounts.
The concept of personal punishment has intuitive appeal. However, given the results
of our control treatment, we can not conclude that the positive price our subjects are
willing to pay is due to this motivation. As a final caveat, personal punishment, as Adam
Smith describes it, is punishment for a grave offense. For obvious reasons, laboratory
experiments can only implement minor offenses, which need not necessarily trigger the
same kind of demand for personal punishment.
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Appendix
A Instructions Experiment
A.1 Instructions
Welcome to our experiment! Please read these instructions carefully. From now on, do
not talk to your neighbors. Please turn off your mobile phone and leave it off till the
end of the experiment. If you have a question, raise your hand. We will then come to
you.
For the experiment, each participant is assigned one of two roles: A or B. You
are in the role of A[B]15 for the entire experiment. Three A are always matched
with one B. No participant will get to know the identity of the other participants.
In the experiment, we use the experimental currency unit Thaler. At the end of the
experiment, the paper Thaler will be exchanged into Euro with a rate of 1 Thaler =
EUR 1. Each participant will be paid private and in cash. Your payout depends on
your decisions during the experiment and on the decisions of the other participants you
are matched with.
Procedure of the experiment
Step 1: Questionnaire Please answer the questionnaire we hand out. You will
get 8 Thaler for doing so.
Step 2: Graph paper Each participant A receives one page of graph paper and
a pen. It is his task to fill this page with “+” and “o” signs according to the template.
For this, he has a maximum of 25 minutes. If he fills the entire page, he produces 10
Thaler. If not, he produces 0 Thaler and does not take part in stages 3 to 6.
Step 3: Decision of B B does now decide on one of the following distributions
of the Thaler produced by A in stage 2 between himself and the A’s and notes this on
decision sheet B. There are two possible distributions, who then are implemented for
all A:
i) 2 Thaler for A and 8 Thaler for B
ii) 10 Thaler for A and 0 Thaler for B
15All subjects got the same instructions, up to this sentence.
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In the first case, each A receives 2 Thaler. B receives 8 Thaler for each A who still
takes part in stage 3 (that means 24, 16, 8 or 0 Thaler when 3, 2, 1, 0 A’s are still
participating). In the second case, each A receives 10 Thaler and B receives 0 Thaler
in total.
Step 4: Transfer The experimenters allocate the Thaler according to the decision
of B. Each A receives:
• those Thaler, that B allocated to him.
• an envelope which contains the Thaler, produced by A, that B allocated to him-
self.
The envelopes must not me opened.
Step 5: Decision of A’s Each A decides on the following question and notes this
on decision sheet A: Should one envelope be destroyed? In case of allocation i) this
will reduce the payout of B by 8 Thaler. If no A answers yes, stage 6 will be does not
apply and the payout of B will not be reduced.
Step 6: Auction All three A take part in this auction, with the exception of
those who dropped out in stage 2. Out of the envelopes exactly one will be destroyed,
two will remain. Each A can bid for the right to destroy his own envelope with the
included money which B would receive from him. Only the winner of the auction may
destroy the envelope. B will not receive any Thaler out of the envelope of the winner.
The auction works all follows: Each A notes the amount of Thaler which he is willing
to bid on decision sheet A (minimum 0 Thaler, maximum 10 Thaler, step size 0.01
Thaler). That A who bids the highest amount of Thaler wins the auction and obtains
the right to destroy his envelope. However A only pays an sum equivalent to the second
highest bid. The cost will be deducted at the payout. There will always be a winner of
the auction. In case of several similar highest bids, the winner will be decided randomly.
Note: In this type of auction, it is optimal to bid just an amount that is equivalent to
what the good on offer (here: the right to destroy the envelope) is worth to oneself.
Step 7: Result of the auction The winner of the auction can now destroy the
envelope and the included Thaler in arbitrary manner. Afterwards, the envelopes of
those A who did not win the auction will be handed to B. B can take the money out
of these envelopes.
Step 8: Questionnaire Finally, please answer the second questionnaire.
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Payment Now all Thaler are exchanged into Euro. All A’s have their 8 Thaler
from stage 1 plus the Thaler from stage 4. The winner additionally has to pay the
second highest bid. B has 8 Thaler from stage 1 plus all Thaler from the envelopes,
with the exception of the destroyed envelope.
A.2 Decision sheet B
ID:
Please note your decisions here, as described in the instructions.
Step 3: Decision Out of the three A’s working for you have completed
stage 2 successfully and produced 10 Thaler.
Please tick a box to mark the allocation you have decided on:
o 2 Thaler for A and 8 Thaler for B or o 10 Thaler for A and 0 Thaler for B
A.3 Decision sheet A
ID:
Please note your decisions here, as described in the instructions.
Step 5: Decision Should the payout of B be reduced by 8 Thaler by destroying
one envelope?
yes o no o
Step 6: Auction Bid: Thaler
(minimum 0 Thaler, maximum 10 Thaler, step size 0.01 Thaler)
A.4 Test Questions
Question 1: What payment will you receive at the end of the experiment, if you are
A and you do not manage to fill out the complete graph paper.
Question 2: As A, you are bidding 2 Thaler in the auction. A second A bids 0 Thaler
and the third A bids 5 Thaler.
a) Who wins the auction and may destroy the white envelope?
b) How much does the winner have to pay?
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Question 3: Assuming all A’s were successful in stage 1 and B did decide on the
allocation “2 Thaler for each A and 8 Thaler for B”. Look at stage 5 and 6.
What is the only case in which the payout of B is not reduced by 8 Thaler?
Question 4: You are B. All A did fill out the complete paper in stage 2 and you
did decide on the allocation “2 Thaler for each A and 8 Thaler for B”. The A’s
decided they want the auction. In the auction, the A’s are bidding exactly as in
question 3. What is your payout at the end of the experiment?
Question 5: You are B. 2 out of 3 A’s did fill out the complete paper in stage 2 and
you did decide on the allocation “10 Thaler for A and 0 Thaler for B”. All A’s
decided against the auction.
a) What payout will you receive at the end of the experiment?
b) What is the payout those A’s who completed the paper will receive?
c) What is the payout of the A who did not complete the entire paper?
A.5 Questionnaire 1
ID:
How happy are you in general?
(very unhappy) o o o o o o o (very happy)
How happy are you at the moment?
(very unhappy) o o o o o o o (very happy)
How old are you?
What is you gender?
o M o F
Are you a student?
o yes o no
If yes: What is you major?
A.6 Questionnaire 2
ID:
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How happy are you at the moment?
(very unhappy) o o o o o o o (very happy)
How did you perceive B’s behavior in stage 3?
(not fair) o o o o o o o (fair)
(not nice) o o o o o o o (nice)
(not comprehensible) o o o o o o o (comprehensible)
(not rational) o o o o o o o (rational)
(not egoistic) o o o o o o o (egoistic)
In general, do you like destroying money?
o true o not true
I am always fair to others, even if I am at a disadvantage because of it.
o true o not true
I think fairness is an exceptionally important characteristic of humans.
o true o not true
I dislike taking responsibility.
o true o not true
I rarely hit back, even if someone else hits me first.
o true o not true
If someone hits me first, I’ll show him.
o true o not true
If I am angry I occasionally bang doors shut.
o true o not true
If someone angers me, I tend to tell him what I think about him.
o true o not true
Even if I don’t show it, I am sometimes consumed with envy.
o true o not true
If someone does not treat me right, I do not let it get at me.
o true o not true
Before we pay out the money, you have the possibility to destroy an arbitrary amount
of your own Thaler lying in front of you. Do you want to destroy Thaler?
o Yes, Thaler o No, I don’t want to destroy my own Thaler.
B Instructions Control
B.1 Instructions
In this experiment, you are, together with 2 other participants, in a group of 3 people.
No participant will get to know the identity of the other participants.
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In front of every participant is an envelope. In this experiment, the right to destroy
this envelope is auctioned off.
Auction All three participants take part in this auction. Exactly one envelope will
be destroyed, two will remain. Each participant can bid for the right to destroy his
own envelope. Only the winner of the auction may destroy the envelope. The auction
works all follows: Each participant notes the amount of Euro which he is willing to bid
on decision sheet (minimum 0 Euro, maximum 10 Euro, step size 0.01 Euro). That
participant who bids the most wins the auction and obtains the right to destroy his
envelope. However he only pays a sum equivalent to the second highest bid. The cost
will be deducted at the payout. There will always be a winner of the auction. In case
of several similar highest bids, the winner will be decided randomly. Note: In this type
of auction, it is optimal to bid just an amount that is equivalent to what the good on
offer (here: the right to destroy the envelope) is worth to oneself.
Result of the auction The winner of the auction can now destroy the envelope in
arbitrary manner. Afterwards, the envelopes of those participants who did not win the
auction will be collected by the experimenters.
Payment The winner has to pay the second highest bid. All other participants pay
nothing.
B.2 Test Questions
Question 1: You are bidding 2 Euro in the auction. A second participant bids 0
Euro and the third bids 5 Euro.
a) Who wins the auction and may destroy the envelope?
b) How much does the winner have to pay?
Question 2: Is it possible in any group that in no participant destroys his envelope?
Question 3:
a) Assume you bid 0 Euro in the auction. What payment will you receive for this
part of the experiment?
b) Assume you bid 0 Euro in the auction and this is the highest bid, the second high-
est being 1 Euro. What payment will you receive for this part of the experiment?
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 III. Punishment with Uncertain Outcomes in the 
Prisoner’s Dilemma* 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Abstract 
 
This paper experimentally investigates whether risk-averse 
individuals punish less if the outcome of punishment is uncertain 
than when it is certain. We compare subjects’ behavior in two 
treatments: Certain Punishment in which the prisoner’s dilemma 
game is followed by a punishment stage allowing subjects to 
decrease the other player’s payoff by 2 Euros; and Uncertain 
Punishment in which subjects could decrease the other player’s 
payoff with a 50% probability by 1 Euro and with a 50% 
probability by 3 Euros. We observe only several instances of 
punishment in our setup. Consequently, we find that in both cases 
risk-averse subjects are equally likely to cooperate in the prisoner’s 
dilemma and equally likely to punish in the punishment stage. 
 
                                                 
* Paper co-authored by Maroš Servátka 
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1. Introduction 
Imagine two researchers working on a joint project. Both can work hard or free-
ride on the work of the other researcher. For a certain set of outcomes this situation 
resembles a prisoner’s dilemma. The researcher’s action will eventually be revealed to 
his co-author, who will then have an opportunity to punish him for slacking off. What 
could a punishment look like? For example, it could take the form of sharing the bad 
experience with other colleagues in the profession. However, it is unclear what effect 
the punishment will have on the free-riding researcher. On one hand, it might affect a 
tenure decision or hiring in a close race for a job or perhaps discourage other colleagues 
to work with the person in the future. On the other hand, the punishment might be 
meaningless if other factors already determined the outcome or when other colleagues 
disregard the information about the free-riding researcher’s input into the project. 
Because the co-author who punishes does not necessarily know the free-riding 
researcher’s situation, she cannot fully assess the impact of the punishment. Thus, the 
decision to punish could be viewed as having an uncertain outcome. In fact, there are 
many real life situations where the punishment might not “get through” at all and thus 
be insignificant to the recipient.1 It is thus natural to ask whether uncertainty associated 
with the punishment outcome is an important determinant of the punishment decision 
and whether the punisher’s risk attitude sheds any light on her behavior. Understanding 
the role of risk attitude might turn out to be socially beneficial as it is likely to affect 
individuals’ willingness to cooperate (Becker, 1968) and potentially also punish. 
Distributional models of other-regarding preferences (e.g., Fehr and Schmidt, 1999; 
Bolton and Ockenfels, 2000; Charness and Rabin, 2002) that are often used to explain 
the punishing behavior noted elsewhere in the literature do not consider uncertainty of 
outcomes. On their own such models cannot provide guidance on whether we should 
observe more or less punishment in situations when its outcome is uncertain. Moreover, 
in the above example the uncertainty pertains to the free-riding researcher but does not 
directly affect the (monetary) payoff of the decision maker. Thus, none of existing 
expected utility theories can be directly applied without making an additional 
assumption on how uncertainty affects preferences over the payoffs of the other person. 
In this paper we introduce the assumption that a decision maker’s risk attitude also 
determines preferences over expected payoffs of other people in the same manner as it 
determines preferences over her own expected payoff. Based on this assumption, we 
                                                 
1 Sometimes punishment might also target a wrong person. 
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form a conjecture that risk-averse subjects punish less if the outcome of punishment is 
uncertain and test it experimentally.  
In the experiment subjects have an opportunity to punish their counterpart, but the 
outcome of punishment depends on the realization of a random variable. The subjects’ 
decisions are compared to those in another treatment in which the outcome of 
punishment is certain. We have embedded our explorations in a one-shot prisoner’s 
dilemma game in which the players decide whether to defect and maximize their own 
monetary payoffs or to cooperate and maximize the joint surplus as we feel that the 
simplicity of the environment is a virtue in exploratory projects such as this one.2 The 
primary reason for the one-shot horizon is to archive clear independence of subjects’ 
decisions. 
Social dilemma situations have been extensively studied in the economics literature 
for a long time (see Roth, 1988 for an overview). Fehr and Gächter (2000a) show that 
incentives to free-ride in a voluntary contribution mechanism (VCM) experiment can be 
counteracted by introducing a second stage which allows for punishment. Despite the 
punishment being costly, many subjects use that opportunity to deter defection. Initially, 
the effect on cooperation is small, but the contributions to a public project increase over 
time in a repeated game. A considerable amount of literature follows this paper and 
extends the result to non-pecuniary sanctions (Masclet et al., 2003; Noussair and 
Tucker, 2005) and explores the effectiveness of punishment (Nikiforakis and Normann, 
2008) as well as the price of punishment (Anderson and Putterman, 2006; Carpenter 
(2007).  
In these experiments (and all other experiments on social dilemmas which we are 
aware of) the outcome of the punishment is certain.3 The literature on contract 
                                                 
2 Despite a large body of experimental literature on cooperation in the prisoner’s dilemma game we are 
not aware of any studies exploring the effect of punishment other than increasing cooperation if the 
interaction is repeated. In Duersch and Servátka (2010) we study whether a possibility of punishment 
increases cooperation (as observed in VCM experiments) by comparing the behavior of subjects in a 
prisoner’s dilemma game without punishment with behavior in the Certain Punishment treatment 
presented in the current paper. We find that the mere availability of punishment does not increase 
cooperation as the subjects correctly anticipate that they will not be punished for defection. 
3 The strategic uncertainty on the side of the recipient can stem from subjects having heterogeneous 
punishment attitudes, such that some will punish in a situation where others will not. We are more 
interested in evaluating the other-regarding utility of the punishing subject, where this strategic 
uncertainty is less pronounced. The experiments which allow for counter-punishment (e.g., Denant-
Boemont et al., 2007; Nikiforakis, 2008; Engelmann and Nikiforakis, 2008) are an exception, because the 
recipient of punishment can spend money to return the punishment. Thus, because of the strategic 
uncertainty stemming from unknown moves of other players, it is not obvious what the outcome of the 
original punishment will be.  
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enforcement which explores whether an agent will exert effort or shirk when faced with 
some probability of being monitored is of little help as the underlying game has a 
sequential rather than simultaneous structure and the experimental investigations (e.g., 
Fehr and Gächter, 2000b; Fehr and List, 2004, Dickinson and Villeval, 2008) focus on 
the effect of punishment on cooperation but not on the decision whether to punish or not 
and neither on its determinants. 
Next we present the experimental setup and our results, followed by a short 
discussion. Instructions can be found in the appendix. 
 
2. Experimental Setup 
The experiment consists of two treatments: Certain Punishment (cp) and Uncertain 
Punishment (ucp) implemented in an across subjects design. In both treatments a 
prisoner’s dilemma game is followed by a punishment stage. The prisoner’s dilemma 
game payoffs (presented in Table 1) are denoted in Euros. The row player chooses Top 
(cooperation) or Bottom (defection), while the column player chooses Left 
(cooperation) or Right (defection). All information was common knowledge. 
 
Table 1: Prisoner's Dilemma Payoffs 
 
 
 
 
 
In the punishment stage of the Certain Punishment treatment subjects could 
decrease their counterpart’s payoff by 2 Euros with certainty at the cost of 1 Euro to 
themselves. In the Uncertain Punishment treatment subjects could decrease the other 
player’s payoff with 50% probability by 1 Euro and with 50% probability by 3 Euros at 
the cost of 1 Euro to themselves.4 Thus, while the expected punishment was the same in 
both cases (2 Euros), its outcome depended on the state of the world in the Uncertain 
                                                 
4 Subjects who earned 0 in the prisoner’s dilemma were able to inflict punishment using their show up 
fee. 
 Left Right 
Top 5,5 0,8 
Bottom 8,0 2,2 
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Punishment treatment. The subjects were instructed that a coin would be flipped in front 
of them to determine the punishment outcome. If the coin toss lands on heads, the other 
player’s payoff is decreased by 1 Euro. If the coins toss lands on tails, the other player’s 
payoff is decreased by 3 Euros. If the subject decided to punish, the costs of punishment 
were incurred irrespective of the outcome of the probability draw.5 
In our experiment the subjects played the game only once as a repeated 
environment would introduce a confounding factor of being punished by someone else 
in previous rounds. It should be noted that most previous experimental designs on 
punishment allow for repeated interaction. The decision to punish could be explained as 
an attempt to induce cooperation in the future. However, Fehr and Gächter (2000a) and 
other studies provide evidence that subjects punish in the last round and that they punish 
in a stranger matching when there is no chance of encountering the same subject(s) 
more than once. Thus, we anticipated observing a relatively large proportion of 
punishing subjects even in the one-shot scenario.  
The expected effectiveness of punishment (2:1) in our experiment is lower than 
usually observed in the literature and the expected costs (1 Euro) are relatively high. 
These two design parameters were driven primarily by the consideration of not allowing 
subjects to make losses as this was the policy of the laboratory where the experiment 
was run. An alternative way of ensuring that subjects do not make losses would have 
been to significantly increase the show up fees. However, this could cause the subjects 
to perceive the game payoffs as relatively small compared to the constant fee. In order 
to get an estimate of whether the cost of punishment or the fear of “over-punishment” 
deterred some of our subjects from punishing, we included a couple of questions 
pertaining to the demand for punishment in a non-paid questionnaire administered at the 
end of the experiment. 
To measure risk attitudes of subjects we used the method developed by Holt and 
Laury (2002). That is, subjects were repeatedly offered a choice between two lotteries, 
one involving higher risk than the other. From subjects’ choices between ten lottery 
pairs it is possible to calculate their individual risk aversion parameter. The instructions 
are provided in the appendix. 
 
 
                                                 
5 We decided to design the uncertain outcome in such a way that the punished person always learns that 
he or she is being punished. It is possible that subjects’ behavior would differ if there was a chance that 
the punished person does not learn about the punishment. However, this was not the focus of our study 
and we leave it for future explorations. 
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2.1 Procedures 
The experiment was conducted at the SonderForschungsBereich 504 laboratory at 
the University of Mannheim in May and June of 2009. It was run manually under a 
single blind social distance protocol. The experiment consisted of 10 sessions that lasted 
on average 50 minutes including the payment of subjects. A total of 140 students of 
various majors (about half either economics or business), recruited from the laboratory 
subject pool, participated in Certain Punishment and Uncertain Punishment treatments. 
Most of the students had previously participated in economics experiments. Each 
subject only participated in a single session of the study. Subjects earned on average 
10.57 Euro, including a 5 Euro show up fee and the payout from the Holt and Laury 
procedure. 
The sequence of events in a session was the following.  (i) Upon entering the 
laboratory subjects drew a ball from an urn. The number that was indicated on the ball 
assigned their seat for the experiment and thus determined the matching which was 
done according to a pre-assigned matching protocol.  (ii) The neutrally framed 
instructions (in German) for the prisoner’s dilemma and the punishment stages were 
handed out. All sheets indicated subjects’ ID numbers.  (iii) The subjects read the 
instructions and afterwards were encouraged to ask questions. All questions were asked 
and answered individually.  (iv) The subjects simultaneously made their decisions for 
the prisoner’s dilemma game.  (v) The experimenters collected the decisions forms, 
transferred the decision information to their anonymous counterparts’ decision forms 
and returned them to subjects. This prevented the exchange of superfluous information 
and aided in maintaining the anonymity of individual decisions.  (vi) After learning the 
decision of the paired player the subjects made their decisions regarding punishment on 
a second decision form.  (vii) The experimenters collected the decision sheets for 
prisoner’s dilemma and punishment stages. 
(viii) Then the instructions and decision forms for the risk attitude elicitation task 
were handed out, filled out by subjects, and collected by the experimenters, one at a 
time. Subjects were informed beforehand that there would be an additional individual 
task after the prisoner’s dilemma game with punishment, but not about the nature of this 
task.  (ix) At the end of the session subjects filled out a questionnaire asking for their 
demand for punishment and demographics.6  (x) Afterwards all of the subjects were 
                                                 
6 Because the decision tasks were relatively simple we opted not to include test questions or examples in 
the instructions in order not to bias the subjects.  Answering the questionnaire was not required for 
payment. 
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paid privately in cash. Each subject received the following amount: the show up fee of 5 
Euro as an endowment plus the earnings in the prisoner’s dilemma minus the 
punishment minus the punishment costs plus a payment for one randomly chosen lottery 
from the risk attitude elicitation task. All uncertainties and lotteries were resolved by 
flipping a coin/rolling a 10-sided die.7 
 
2.2 Predictions and Hypotheses 
In the classical solution for self-regarding preferences no punishment will ever be 
observed in our setup because it is costly and players will always choose to defect.8 Via 
models of other regarding preferences, e.g. inequity aversion, it is possible to explain 
punishment. However, popular other regarding preferences models are silent on the 
issue of risk. How risk is to be incorporated into the utility function is not explained. 
Therefore, these models do not offer a clear prediction whether we should observe more 
punishment in our Uncertain Punishment treatment or not. 
It is well known that for risk averse subjects, lotteries over outcomes are worth less 
than their expected value: 
)(5.0)(5.0)5.05.0( highlowhighlow xUxUxxU   
Our research question relates to subjects’ risk attitudes as predictors of their 
punishing behavior in the face of uncertain outcomes.  Model our subjects’ utility to 
depends on their own payoff and the punishment inflicted on the paired player, U(x,p). 
If subjects value punishment, and if they are risk averse, we might expect them to be 
risk averse with respect to the strength of punishment as well. So a comparable 
inequality to the one above might be: 
),(5.0),(5.0)5.05.0,( highlowhighlow pxUpxUppxU   
Hence, we formulate the null as follows: 
H0: Risk-averse subjects punish less in Uncertain Punishment than in Certain 
Punishment.  
 
                                                 
7 The coin was flipped publicly by a randomly chosen subject. The die was rolled individually by each 
subject at the time of payment. 
8 Even when a self-regarding subject expects to be punished, defecting and not punishing is still a 
(weakly) dominant strategy. 
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3. Results 
As our hypothesis is connected to subjects’ risk aversion, we start off by describing 
the distribution of risk attitudes in our sample. The risk attitudes were elicited after the 
punishment decisions had been made but before the decision of the paired player or the 
punishment outcome were revealed. In the Holt and Laury method the risk attitude is 
determined by the number of safe choices made when choosing between a relatively 
safe and a risky lottery. Never choosing the safe lottery corresponds to an extremely 
risk-loving subject. On the other hand, the higher the number of safe choices, the more 
risk-averse the subject is.  
Figure 1: Distribution of Risk Attitudes 
 
The distribution of safe choices is shown in Figure 1. Risk neutrality corresponds 
to choosing the safe lottery exactly four times.9 A Kolmogorov-Smirnov test on the cut-
                                                 
9 Definite statements about the risk attitude are only possible if the choices are monotonically ordered, 
that is when there is one lottery such that the subject always chooses the relatively safe lottery for lower 
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off value in the Holt and Laury task shows that there is no significant difference in the 
distribution of risk attitudes between the two treatments. In line with other experiments 
(e.g., Harrison, 1986; Cox et al., 1988; Holt and Laury, 2002; Eckel and Grossman, 
2008) most of our subjects show a considerable amount of risk aversion while only a 
few are risk-loving. 
Despite a relatively large number of subjects in both treatments (n = 70) we 
observe few instances of punishment: there was only 1 subject who punished in Certain 
Punishment and 8 subjects who punished in Uncertain Punishment. It appears that given 
the cost and effectiveness of punishment, the subjects were unwilling to spend resources 
to decrease the payoff of the other person in a one-shot game where the punishment 
could not lead to more cooperation in the future. However, at this stage we are not able 
to provide a definitive answer why our subjects did not punish.10 
 
Table 2: Subjects’ Behavior in the Prisoner’s Dilemma Game and Punishment Stage across 
Treatments 
  Prisoner’s Dilemma Punishment Stage 
 # observations Cooperate Defect Punish 
     
Certain 
Punishment 70 
23  
32.9% 
47  
68.1% 
1 
1.4% 
     
Uncertain 
Punishment 70 
31  
44.3% 
39  
55.7% 
8 
11.4% 
 
Our main hypothesis asserts that risk-averse subjects punish less if the punishment 
outcome is uncertain. At the same time, the punishment decision likely depends on the 
history of play: When making their choice, subjects who cooperated might decide 
differently from those who defected and probably behave differently towards 
cooperators than towards defectors (data presented in Appendix 1).  
                                                                                                                                               
ranked lottery pairs and the more risky lottery for higher ranked lottery pairs; 93.6% of our subjects 
display such monotonic choice behavior. In the analysis we use the data on all subjects but control for 
those whose choices were non-monotonic (“inconsistent”) and also for those who chose the dominated 
safe option in the last row of the risk attitude elicitation task (“confused”). 
10 It is possible that the observed behavior is driven by the large proportion of business and economics 
majors in our sample. Marwell and Ames (1981), Carter and Irons (1991), Frank et al. (1993), and 
Rubinstein (2006) show that economics students behave in accordance with the predictions of 
neoclassical theory. However, adding a dummy for business/economics students does not change our 
main result. 
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To address this issue we include a dummy variable for a subject’s own behavior in 
the prisoner’s dilemma (OwnPD) and for the behavior of his or her counterpart 
(OtherPD) in the probit model exploring the determinants of punishment. In the 
regression reported in Table 3 Uncertain Punishment represents a treatment dummy 
variable; Risk aversion a dummy for risk-averse subjects; Confused a dummy which 
takes on the value of 1 if the subject chose the lower paying lottery in the last row of the 
risk attitude elicitation task;11 and Age and Male are the subject’s age and gender as 
reported in the post-experimental questionnaire. 
While we observe that both one’s own and the paired person’s behavior in the 
prisoner’s dilemma game are important factors of the punishment decision, risk 
aversion, age, and gender are insignificant. If we exclude socio-demographic variables 
the statistical significance of OwnPD and OtherPD decreases (presented on the right 
hand side of Table 3). This result is robust to representing the risk attitude by the 
number of safe choices instead of the risk aversion dummy, to excluding inconsistent 
subjects, and also to including an interaction variable UCP x RA. Hence, we reject 
hypothesis H0.12  
 
Table 3: Probit Regression Estimates for the Punishment Behavior 
Punish 
Coefficie
nt 
St. 
Error Z p > |z| 
Coefficie
nt 
St. 
Error Z p > |z| 
Own PD 0.87 0.42 2.07 0.038 0.66 0.38 1.74 0.083 
Other PD -1.11 0.55 -2.00 0.045 -0.65 0.42 -1.57 0.117 
Risk 
Aversion -0.49 0.45 -1.11 0.267 -0.30 0.42 -0.72 0.470 
Confused 1.91 0.94 2.03 0.043     
Age -0.03 0.06 -0.05 0.961     
Male -0.19 0.41 -0.46 0.647     
                                                 
11 In total, there are 9 inconsistent subjects (5 in Certain Punishment and 4 in Uncertain Punishment) and 
3 confused ones (all 3 in Uncertain Punishment). However, none of the inconsistent subjects punished. 
12 Because of the low number of punishment instances we also use the Fisher's exact test to verify that the 
proportion of cooperators who punished defectors in Certain Punishment is greater than in Uncertain 
Punishment. The null is rejected at p = 0.360. 
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Uncertain 
Punishment 0.97 0.51 1.88 0.060 1.03 0.48 2.17 0.030 
Constant -2.02 1.49 -1.35 0.176 -2.12 0.58 -3.68 0.000 
 Number of observations = 140 
 
Recall that in order to keep our design simple we chose to restrict the punishment 
to only one (expected) option. However, it is possible that some subjects would like to 
punish more or less and thus the size of desired punishment might vary across 
treatments. In order to get at least partially at this issue, in the post-experimental 
questionnaire we asked our subjects the following question:  
 
If you could decide how much to destroy of the other player’s payoff how much 
would you like to destroy?  
 
About 20% of subjects provided a positive number as their answer. The answers do 
not significantly vary between treatments, suggesting that the size of the desired 
punishment does not interact with uncertainty of its outcome. When we treat the 
subjects’ answers as observations, a tobit regression (presented in Appendix 2) shows a 
similar pattern: Risk-averse subjects did not want to destroy more or less in the 
Uncertain Punishment than in the Certain Punishment, thus providing further support 
for rejecting H0. 
We also verify the effect of risk aversion on the decision to cooperate. The result 
supports our finding reported in Duersch and Servátka (2010) that risk aversion does not 
influence subjects’ willingness to cooperate.  
4. Discussion 
This paper reports an experiment designed to study the role of risk attitude in 
punishing behavior when the outcome of punishment is uncertain. We assume that if the 
decision maker is risk-averse, her behavior will exhibit risk-aversion also over the 
payoffs of the person who is being punished. We observe a relatively low number of 
punishment instances in our setup and find no evidence that risk aversion is a factor 
when making a decision to punish. 
There are several potential explanations and implications for our findings. We 
discuss three of them which are directly related to our design. The first one is that our 
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assumption about risk aversion does not reflect reality. Based on models of conditional 
other-regarding preferences (e.g. Dufwenberg and Kirchsteiger, 2004; Falk and 
Fischbacher, 2006; Cox et al., 2007; Cox et al., 2008) if the decision maker decides to 
punish, it can be argued that the aim of such action is not to benefit the other person but 
to hurt him. As our design does not allow for various levels of punishment, it is possible 
that a decision maker takes into account the uncertainty affecting the punished person in 
order to hurt him more. Such approach could explain the seemingly higher number of 
instances of uncertain punishment: Assuming that the recipient of punishment is risk-
averse, the uncertain punishment is a stronger punishment than the certain one. 
The second explanation is connected with the use of Holt and Laury's measure of 
risk attitudes which might be not reflect the same type of risk attitude present in 
punishment decisions (Isaac and James, 2000; Dave et al., 2007; Deck et al., 2009). 
Thus, a robustness check of our findings with respect to a different risk attitude 
elicitation method seems warranted.  
Finally, in our experiment the punished person always learns that he or she is being 
punished. It is possible that our results do not directly apply to environments in which 
there is a chance that the punished person does not find out about the punishment. 
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Appendix 1. 
 
Table 4: Subjects’ Punishment Decisions Based on the History of Play 
 Own Behavior 
 
Other Person’s 
Behavior 
 
Punishment 
Cooperate  Cooperate Defect 1 
Cooperate  
Certain 
Punishment Defect Defect  
 
Cooperate 1 Cooperate Defect 4 
Cooperate 1 
Uncertain 
Punishment Defect Defect 2 
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Appendix 2. 
 
Table 5: Tobit Regression Estimates for Destroy 
Destroy Coefficient St. Error t p > |t| 
Own PD 9.22 2.37 3.89 0.000 
Other PD -5.68 2.31 -2.46 0.015 
Risk aversion 0.72 2.45 0.30 0.768 
Confused 3.69 6.53 0.57 0.573 
Age -0.27 0.29 -0.94 0.349 
Male 1.80 2.05 0.88 0.349 
Uncertain Punishment 2.84 2.11 1.35 0.180 
Constant -6.01 7.59 -0.79 0.430 
Number of observations = 138, left-censored at 0. 
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Appendix 3. UNCERTAIN PUNISHMENT INSTRUCTIONS 
(Translation from German, for column players. The decision forms were printed on 
separate sheets. The original instructions are available from the authors upon 
request.) 
 
GENERAL INSTRUCTIONS 
 
No talking: Now that the experiment has begun, we ask that you do not talk or 
communicate any longer with each other. If you have a question after we finish reading the 
instructions, please raise your hand and the experimenter will approach you and answer 
your question in private. 
 
Monetary payments: The experiment will consist of two stages and will be followed 
by a separate decision problem for which you will get paid as well. The amount of 
money you make will depend on the choices made (as described below). Each 
participant will receive a lump sum payment of 5 Euro. This one-off payment can be 
used to pay for eventual losses. Your earnings will be paid to you in cash individually 
and privately at the end of the session. 
 
Matching: During the session you will be matched with another person. However, no 
participant will ever know the identity of the person he or she is matched with. 
 
Roles: In the experiment a "row" player is always randomly matched with a "column" 
player. You are the column player. 
 
INSTRUCTIONS – STAGE 1 
 
Your decision in Stage 1: On the DECISION FORM 1 you will see a payoff table. The 
row player decides between Top and Bottom rows, and the column player decides 
between the Left and Right columns. The intersection of the designated row and column 
determines which part of the payoff matrix is relevant (Top Left, Top Right, Bottom 
Left, Bottom Right) and thus determines the earnings for each person. In each cell, the 
row player's payoff is shown first and the column player’s payoff is shown second. 
Your payoff is printed in bold. 
After you have made the decision, we will collect the decision forms and inform you 
about the decision of your matched row player. 
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DECISION FORM – STAGE 1 
 
 Left Right 
Top $5, $5 $0, $8 
Bottom $8, $0 $2, $2 
 
Please circle either the Left or the Right column. 
INSTRUCTIONS – STAGE 2 
Your Decision in Stage 2: After learning the other player’s decision in Stage 1, you 
can decrease the other player’s payoff with 50% probability by 1 Euro and with 50% 
probability by 3 Euro at the cost of 1 Euro to you. We will flip a coin in front of you to 
determine the outcome. If the heads comes up, the other player’s payoff will decrease by 1 
Euro. If the tails comes up, the other player’s payoff will decrease by 3 Euro. 
If you decide to decrease the other player’s payoff, you will circle the words “I want to 
decrease the other player’s payoff.” 
If you decide to not change the other player’s payoff, you will circle the words “I do 
not want to change the other player’s payoff.” 
The other player can also decrease your payoff or leave it unchanged. 
 
 
DECISION FORM – STAGE 2 
Do you want to decrease the other player’s payoff by 1 Euro with probability 50% and 
by 3 Euros with probability 50% at the cost of 1 Euro to you? Please circle. 
I want to decrease the other player’s payoff.  
OR  
I do not want to change the other player’s payoff. 
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RISK ATTITUDE ELICITATION 
 
The next page shows ten decision questions. Each decision is a paired choice between 
"Option A" and "Option B."  
 
You will make ten choices and record these in the box to the left of the option. That is, 
if you prefer option A to option B, you will mark an X by option A. Only one of the ten 
decisions will be used in the end to determine your earnings for this part of the 
experiment. 
 
A ten-sided die will be used to determine payoffs; the faces are numbered from 1 to 10 
(the "0" face of the die will serve as 10.) After you have made all of your choices, you 
will throw this die twice, once to select one of the ten decisions to be used, and a second 
time to determine what your payoff is for the option you chose, A or B, for the 
particular decision selected. Even though you will make ten decisions, only one of these 
will end up affecting your earnings, but you will not know in advance which decision 
will be used. Obviously, each decision has an equal chance of being used in the end. 
 
Now, please look at Decision 1 at the top. Option A pays $2.00 if the throw of the ten 
sided die is 1, and it pays $1.60 if the throw is 2-10. Option B yields $3.85 if the throw 
of the die is 1, and it pays $0.10 if the throw is 2-10. The other Decisions are similar, 
except that as you move down the table, the chances of the higher payoff for each 
option increase. In fact, for Decision 10 in the bottom row, the die will not be needed 
since each option pays the highest payoff for sure, so your choice here is between $2.00 
Euro or $3.85. 
 
To summarize, you will make ten choices: for each decision row you will have to 
choose between Option A and Option B. You may choose A for some decision rows 
and B for other rows, and you may change your decisions and make them in any order.  
 
When you are finished, we will collect your decision sheet. Again, two persons from the 
class will be randomly selected to receive the monetary payoffs. To determine the 
payoffs from this task you will throw the ten-sided die to select which of the ten 
Decisions will be used. Then you will throw the die again to determine the money 
earnings for the Option you chose for that Decision. If you are selected, earnings (in $) 
for this choice will be paid to you in cash when we finish. 
 
So now please look at the empty boxes on the record sheet. You will have to mark an X 
in one and only one of the boxes in each row, depending whether you prefer option A or 
option B. Then the die throw will determine which of the ten decisions is going to 
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count. We will look at the decision that you made for the one that counts, and circle it, 
before throwing the die again to determine your earnings for this part. 
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DECISION FORM 
Option A 
 ⁭  2.00€ with probability of 1/10,    
1.60€ with probability of 9/10              OR 
 ⁭  2.00€with probability of 2/10,    1.60€ 
with probability of 8/10              OR  
 ⁭  2.00€ with probability of 3/10,    
1.60€ with probability of 7/10              OR 
 ⁭  2.00€ with probability of 4/10,    
1.60€ with probability of 6/10              OR 
 ⁭  2.00€ with probability of 5/10,    
1.60€ with probability of 5/10              OR 
 ⁭  2.00€ with probability of 6/10,    
1.60€ with probability of 4/10              OR 
 ⁭  2.00€ with probability of 7/10,    
1.60€ with probability of 3/10              OR 
 ⁭  2.00€ with probability of 8/10,    
1.60€ with probability of 2/10              OR 
 ⁭  2.00€ with probability of 9/10,    
1.60€ with probability of 1/10              OR 
 ⁭  2.00€ with probability of 10/10,    
1.60€ with probability of 0/10              OR 
 
Option B 
 ⁭  3.85€ with probability of 1/10,    
0.10€ with probability of 9/10 
 ⁭  3.85€ with probability of 2/10,    
0.10€ with probability of 8/10 
 ⁭  3.85€ with probability of 3/10,    
0.10€ with probability of 7/10 
 ⁭  3.85€ with probability of 4/10,    
0.10€ with probability of 6/10 
 ⁭  3.85€ with probability of 5/10,    
0.10€ with probability of 5/10 
 ⁭  3.85€ with probability of 6/10,    
0.10€ with probability of 4/10 
 ⁭  3.85€ with probability of 7/10,    
0.10€ with probability of 3/10 
 ⁭  3.85€ with probability of 8/10,    
0.10€ with probability of 2/10 
 ⁭  3.85€ with probability of 9/10,    
0.10€ with probability of 1/10 
 ⁭  3.85€ with probability of 10/10,   
0.10€ with probability of 0/10 
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QUESTIONNAIRE 
 
 
Thank you for participating in the experiment. Finally, please answer the following questions. 
Your answers will have no impact on your final payoff.  
 
1. If you could decide how much to destroy of the other player’s payoff how much would 
you like to destroy?  
 
2. How much of your own payoff would you be willing to pay for it? 
 
3. How old are you? 
 
4. What is your gender? 
 
5. What is your major? 
 
6. In which country were you born/raised? 
 
 IV. (No) Punishment in the One-Shot Prisoner’s 
Dilemma* 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Abstract 
 
Does a mere availability of punishment increase cooperation 
in the one-shot prisoner’s dilemma game? In our experiment we 
observe that the subjects almost never use punishment. 
Consistently, the data shows no increase in the cooperation rate as 
the subjects correctly anticipated that they would not be punished 
for defection. Thus, the availability of punishment is ineffective in 
inducing cooperation in a one-shot game. Moreover, we do not 
find any evidence that risk attitude is a factor when making the 
decision to cooperate. 
 
 
 
 
                                                 
* Paper co-authored by Maroš Servátka 
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1. Introduction 
Does a mere availability of punishment increase cooperation? Ostrom et al. (1992) 
point out that allowing for sanctions imposed by peers increases cooperation in 
interactions where the individual interest is in conflict with the group interest and 
therefore, leads to socially superior outcomes. However, the punishment changes the 
strategic nature of the game and thus it is not obvious whether it is the altered incentives 
or the mere availability of punishment that shape the behavior. Moreover, many social 
and economic interactions are repeated in nature, confounding the effect of punishment 
with reputation building. To address these two issues we design an experiment that 
preserves defection as the dominant action and eliminates the opportunity of enforcing 
cooperation in future play. 
Since Ostrom et al. (1992) a wide body of experimental literature has focused on 
the viability of various punishment schemes (either experimenter-imposed as in 
Falkinger et al., 2000; Dickinson, 2001; Croson et al., 2006 or participant-imposed as in 
the strand of literature that originated with Fehr and Gächter, 2000) to enhance 
cooperative efforts. In the participant-imposed punishment experiments the punishment 
usually is costly, yet many subjects use that opportunity to deter defection, as predicted 
by distributional models of other-regarding preferences (e.g., Fehr and Schmidt 1999; 
Bolton and Ockenfels 2000; Charness and Rabin 2002). The presence of a sanctioning 
mechanism thus enables reaping the benefits of cooperation in the long-run (Gächter, et 
al. 2008).  
Most of the previous research on punishment is set in a repeated voluntary 
contribution mechanism (VCM) and does not provide a clear-cut answer to our research 
question.1 To the best of our knowledge, the only study on punishment in a one-shot 
VCM setting has been done by Walker and Halloran (2004) who find that having the 
opportunity to punishment has no impact on the level of cooperation. However, the 
costly punishment is a public good itself and several studies (e.g. Fehr and Gächter, 
2002) provide evidence that not all individuals punish. Therefore, it is possible that 
Walker and Halloran do not observe an increase in cooperation because subjects 
anticipate the other group members to free ride on punishment. In our experiment we 
eliminate this consideration by focusing on groups of only two players. 
While it would be possible to construct a one-shot two-player VCM scenario with 
punishment, we believe that simplicity of experimental design is a virtue and therefore 
                                                 
1 The primary reason for the one-shot horizon is the necessity of independence of subjects’ decisions on 
the previous play. 
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we have embedded our explorations in a prisoner’s dilemma game in which the players 
have only two actions. Each player decides whether to defect and maximize his own 
monetary payoff or to cooperate and maximize the joint surplus (see Roth, 1988).2 
Finally, the (strategic) uncertainty associated with a chance of being punished is 
likely to be an important determinant of cooperating behavior. Becker (1968) assumes 
that subjects use the expected probability of being punished when evaluating their 
actions. Based on this motivation we also explore in our experiment whether the 
decision-maker’s risk attitude sheds any light on individuals’ willingness to cooperate. 
 
2. The Experiment 
Out experiment consists of two treatments, Baseline and Punishment, implemented 
in an across subjects design. In each treatment a prisoner’s dilemma game is played. 
The game payoffs (presented in Table 1) are denoted in Euros. The row player chooses 
Top (cooperation) or Bottom (defection), while the column player chooses Left 
(cooperation) or Right (defection).  
Table 1: Prisoner's Dilemma Payoffs 
 
 
 
 
In Punishment, after being notified of the result of the prisoner’s dilemma game, 
subjects could decrease their counterpart’s payoff by 2 Euros at the cost of 1 Euro to 
themselves; in Baseline there was no punishment stage.3 All information was common 
knowledge. 
                                                 
2 Despite the extensive literature on cooperation in the prisoner’s dilemma and numerous studies on 
punishment in the repeated VCM, we are not aware of any studies exploring the effect of punishment in a 
one-shot prisoner’s dilemma. Although the prisoner’s dilemma incorporates motivations present also in 
the VCM there is no experimental evidence whether (the availability of) punishment increases 
cooperation. Gangadharan and Nikiforakis (2009) bridge the literature between a repeated prisoner’s 
dilemma and VCM without punishment. They find that subjects behave more cooperatively in the 
prisoner’s dilemma than in the VCM if they are in a group of four players but do not find a difference if 
the two games are played in pairs 
3 Subjects who earned 0 in the prisoner’s dilemma were able to inflict punishment using their show up 
fee. 
 Left Right 
Top 5,5 0,8 
Bottom 8,0 2,2 
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The demand for punishment depends on the price subjects have to pay for 
destroying a unit of the other person’s monetary payoff. Carpenter (2002), Falk et al. 
(2005) and Nikiforakis and Normann (2008) all find that more effective punishment 
technologies lead to more punishment. Our effectiveness of 2:1 is slightly lower than 
typically used in the VCM literature, but the occurrence of punishment is still reported 
for even lower effectiveness than ours. This design was driven by two main 
considerations: (1) If the punishment is inflicted, it should be significantly damaging 
(costly) relative to the recipient’s (punisher’s) payoffs from the experiment. (2) At the 
same time we wanted to ensure that subjects would not make losses, as this was the 
policy of the laboratory where the experiment was run. An alternative way of avoiding 
the subjects making losses was to increase the show up fees. However, this could 
potentially cause the subjects to perceive the game payoffs as relatively small and alter 
their behavior. 
The experiment was conducted at the SonderForschungsBereich 504 laboratory at 
the University of Mannheim in May and June of 2009. It was run manually under a 
single blind social distance protocol. The experiment consisted of 7 sessions (3 in 
Baseline and 4 in Punishment) that lasted on average 40 minutes including the payment 
of subjects. A total of 114 students of various majors (about half either economics or 
business) participated as subjects. Most of the students had previously participated in 
economics experiments. Subjects earned on average 10.55 Euro including a 5 Euro 
show up fee. 
Upon entering the laboratory subjects were randomly assigned a seat and paired 
according to a pre-assigned matching protocol. The instructions were neutrally framed 
and subjects were encouraged to ask questions. The questions were asked and answered 
individually. After subjects had made their Baseline/Punishment treatment decisions, 
the Holt and Laury (2002) risk attitude elicitation task was conducted. Subjects were 
informed beforehand that there would be an additional individual task, but not about the 
nature of this task. At the end of the session subjects were asked to answer a 
questionnaire.4  
All subjects were paid privately and individually. Each subject received the 
following amount: an endowment of 5 Euro plus the earnings in the prisoner’s dilemma 
minus the punishment minus the punishment costs plus a payment for one randomly 
                                                 
4 The decision tasks were relatively simple and in order not to bias the subjects we opted not to include 
test questions or examples in the instructions. Answering the questionnaire was not a requirement for 
payment. 
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chosen lottery from the risk attitude elicitation task. All lotteries were resolved by 
rolling a 10-sided die at the time of the payment. 
3. Hypotheses 
For self-regarding subjects, defecting in the prisoner’s dilemma and not punishing 
in the second stage is a dominant strategy.  
 
Hypothesis 1a: Cooperation (self-regarding) 
 Subjects will never cooperate and never punish. 
 
The Fehr and Schmidt (1999) model of inequality aversion that has been 
prominently used in the punishment literature to explain the behavior of subjects, offers 
a different prediction: For sufficiently big values of the parameter for disadvantageous 
inequality aversion, α, subjects will punish. Similarly, subjects with high values of 
advantageous inequality aversion, β, will cooperate in the prisoner’s dilemma.5 
 
Hypothesis 1b: Cooperation (inequality-averse) 
 Strongly inequality-averse subjects will cooperate in the prisoner’s dilemma and 
punish defectors. 
 
How does the strategic uncertainty of the game influence risk-averse subjects? If 
subjects expect that some of the other subjects are strongly inequality-averse and punish 
defectors, while others are self-regarding or only weakly inequality-averse, they will 
form subjective beliefs about the probability of being punished for defection. Then, due 
to the uncertainty, the payoff from defection is smaller for risk-averse subjects than for 
risk-neutral ones. On the other hand, the payoff from cooperation is similar for both, 
assuming that the probability of being punished for cooperating is zero. 
 
Hypothesis 2: Risk-aversion 
 In Punishment, risk-averse subjects will cooperate more than risk-neutral ones. 
 
                                                 
5 Subjects with α > 1 prefer to punish. Fehr and Schmidt suggest that the value is typically equal or 
smaller than one. However, it might be greater than one for some people. Subjects will cooperate against 
a cooperator, if their value of β is larger than 3/8 (ignoring the punishment). Of course, in the experiment, 
subjects do not know whether they play against a cooperator or a defector. A positive belief of playing 
against a defector raises the β needed for cooperation to be optimal. 
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4. Results 
Table 2 presents subjects’ behavior in the prisoner’s dilemma game and in the 
punishment stage. In Baseline 43.2% of subjects chose to cooperate with their partner. 
The cooperation rate decreased to 32.9% with the introduction of punishment.6 
However, this decrease is not statistically significant (2-sided Fisher exact test p-value = 
0.360). Similarly, there is no significant difference in the cooperation rate between risk 
averse and non-risk averse subjects (p = 0.815). We observe only one instance of 
punishment despite a relatively large number of subjects in the punishment treatment (n 
= 70).  
 
Our subjects’ behavior supports the prediction of the self-regarding preferences 
model with regard to punishment, as the subjects were unwilling to spend resources to 
decrease the payoff of the other person in a one-shot game. However, self-regarding 
subjects would never cooperate in the prisoner’s dilemma. The observed behavior is 
thus consistent with the predictions of the Fehr and Schmidt model of inequality 
aversion given values of α lower than 1 and a range of values of β. No change in the 
cooperation rate in conjunction with the lack of punishing behavior suggests that 
subjects rationally expected that they would not be punished for defection. 
 
Table 2: Subjects’ Behavior in the Prisoner’s Dilemma Game and Punishment Stage 
  Prisoner’s Dilemma Punishment Stage 
 # observations Cooperate Defect Punish 
Baseline 44 19  43.2% 
25  
56.8% - 
     
Punishment 70 23  32.9% 
47  
68.1% 
1 
1.4% 
 
To assess the effect of risk aversion on cooperation, we run a probit regression and 
report the results in Table 3.7 Punishment is a dummy variable for the respective 
treatment; Risk Attitude is the number of safe choices in the risk attitude elicitation task; 
Risk Attitude*Punishment is the interaction term between risk attitude and the 
                                                 
6 It is possible that the observed behavior is driven by the large proportion of business and economics 
majors in our sample (53 out of 114 subjects study business, economics or a closely related field).  
7 As expected under random treatment allocation of subjects, a Kolmogorov-Smirnov test on the 
distribution of the cut-off value in the Holt and Laury task shows that there is no significant difference in 
the distribution of risk attitudes between the two treatments. 
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punishment treatment; Inconsistent is a dummy which takes on the value of 1 if the 
subject “jumped” back and forth between lotteries in the risk attitude elicitation task;8 
Age and Male are the subject’s age and gender as reported in the post-experimental 
questionnaire. The estimated coefficients are presented in the first column: We find no 
significant effect for the interaction term and thus no support for Hypothesis 2. This is 
robust to excluding the demographic variables (results presented on the right hand side 
of Table 3) and to representing the risk attitude by a dummy for risk averse subjects 
instead of the number of safe choices.9 
 
Table 3: Probit Regression Estimates for the Cooperation Behavior 
Cooperate Coef. 
St. 
Error Z p > |z| Coef. 
St. 
Error Z p > |z| 
Punishment -1.33 1.01 -1.31 .189 -1.30 .99 -1.31 .189 
Risk Attitude -.11 .12 -.89 .373 -.10 .12 -.85 .393 
Risk Attitude 
*Punishment .18 .17 1.06 .290 .18 .17 1.08 .282 
Inconsistent .38 .54 0.71 .481     
Age -.02 .03 -0.61 .545     
Male -.08 .26 -0.33 .743     
Constant .89 .99 0.90 .368 -.42 .72 .59 0.557 
Number of observations = 114 
 
5. Discussion 
This paper reports an experiment designed to study the effect of punishment on 
cooperation in the one-shot prisoner’s dilemma. We observe that our subjects almost 
never use punishment. Consistent with this finding, including a punishment stage had 
no significant effect on the cooperation rate, suggesting that subjects correctly 
anticipated that they would not be punished for defection. Our results thus point out that 
                                                 
8 In total, there are 6 inconsistent subjects (1 in Baseline and 5 in Punishment). 
9 For the obvious reason of having no data on punishment we cannot study the effect of risk attitude on 
the decision to punish. 
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the mere availability of punishment is ineffective in inducing more cooperation. Unlike 
us, Sutter et al. (forthcoming) find that giving subjects the opportunity of punishment as 
an institutional choice suffices to promote cooperation in a repeated VCM even if 
subjects choose not to punish. Although the experimental designs are too different to 
draw clear-cut conclusions, Sutter et al.’s study once again suggests that the time 
horizon is crucial for cooperation.  
At the first glance, the low occurrence of punishment in our setup seems to be at 
odds with the literature on repeated public goods VCM where punishment successfully 
deters free riding. As mentioned above, Walker and Halloran (2004) also find that in 
one-shot VCM the punishment threat does not affect cooperation rates. It appears that 
subjects are reluctant to waste their resources on punishment if there is no future. 
However, studies by Carpenter (2007) and Nikiforakis and Normann (2008) suggest 
that the demand for punishment and the effectiveness of punishment are important 
determinants of subjects’ decisions and therefore call for more research seems 
warranted. 
Finally, we do not find any evidence that risk attitude is a factor when making a 
decision to cooperate. This second finding might be due to the anticipated absence of 
punishment and/or connected with the use of Holt and Laury's measure of risk attitudes 
that might be not appropriate for punishment decisions such as the one presented in this 
paper. Studies by Isaac and James (2000), Eckel and Wilson (2004) and Dave et al. 
(2007) point out that different techniques of measuring risk attitudes yield significantly 
different estimates and a recent paper by Deck et al. (2009) finds that their subjects 
behave as though Holt and Laury task was an investment decision.  
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Appendix 
Translation from German (column player version). The decision forms and the 
questionnaire were printed on separate sheets. The original instructions are available 
from the authors upon request. 
 
1. GENERAL INSTRUCTIONS 
INSTRUCTIONS 
 
No talking: Now that the experiment has begun, we ask that you do not talk or 
communicate any longer with each other. If you have a question after we finish reading the 
instructions, please raise your hand and the experimenter will approach you and answer 
your question in private. 
 
Monetary payments: The experiment will consist of two stages and will be followed 
by a separate decision problem for which you will get paid as well. The amount of 
money you make will depend on the choices made (as described below). Each 
participant will receive a lump sum payment of 5 Euro. [Punishment: This one-off 
payment can be used to pay for eventual losses.] Your earnings will be paid to you in 
cash individually and privately at the end of the session. 
 
Matching: During the session you will be matched with another person. However, no 
participant will ever know the identity of the person he or she is matched with. 
 
Roles: In the experiment a "row" player is always randomly matched with a "column" 
player. You are the column player. 
 
DECISION [Punishment: INSTRUCTIONS – STAGE 1] 
 
Your decision [Punishment: Your decision in Stage 1]: On the DECISION FORM 
[Punishment: DECISION FORM 1] you will see a payoff table. The row player decides 
between Top and Bottom rows, and the column player decides between the Left and 
Right columns. The intersection of the designated row and column determines which 
part of the payoff matrix is relevant (Top Left, Top Right, Bottom Left, Bottom Right) 
and thus determines the earnings for each person. In each cell, the row player's payoff is 
shown first and the column player’s payoff is shown second. Your payoff is printed in 
bold. 
After you have made the decision, we will collect the decision forms and inform you 
about the decision of your matched row player. 
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DECISION FORM  [Punishment: DECISION FORM – STAGE 1] 
 Left Right 
Top $5, $5 $0, $8 
Bottom $8, $0 $2, $2 
Please circle either the Left or the Right column. 
[Only in Punishment] INSTRUCTIONS – STAGE 2 
Your Decision in Stage 2: After learning the other player’s decision in Stage 1, you 
can decrease the other player’s payoff by 2 Euro at the cost of 1 Euro to you. 
If you decide to decrease the other player’s payoff, you will circle the words “I want to 
decrease the other player’s payoff.” 
If you decide to not change the other player’s payoff, you will circle the words “I do 
not want to change the other player’s payoff.” 
The other player can also decrease your payoff or leave it unchanged. 
 
 
[Only in Punishment] DECISION FORM – STAGE 2 
Do you want to decrease the other player’s payoff by 2 Euro at the cost of 1 Euro to 
you? Please circle. 
I want to decrease the other player’s payoff.  
OR  
I do not want to change the other player’s payoff. 
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2. INSTRUCTIONS RISK ATTITUDE ELICITATION 
 
INSTRUCTIONS 
 
The next page shows ten decision questions. Each decision is a paired choice between 
"Option A" and "Option B."  
 
You will make ten choices and record these in the box to the left of the option. That is, 
if you prefer option A to option B, you will mark an X by option A. Only one of the ten 
decisions will be used in the end to determine your earnings for this part of the 
experiment. 
 
A ten-sided die will be used to determine payoffs; the faces are numbered from 1 to 10 
(the "0" face of the die will serve as 10.) After you have made all of your choices, we 
will throw this die twice, once to select one of the ten decisions to be used, and a second 
time to determine what your payoff is for the option you chose, A or B, for the 
particular decision selected. Even though you will make ten decisions, only one of these 
will end up affecting your earnings, but you will not know in advance which decision 
will be used. Obviously, each decision has an equal chance of being used in the end. 
 
Now, please look at Decision 1 at the top. Option A pays 2.00€ if the throw of the ten 
sided die is 1, and it pays 1.60€ if the throw is 2-10. Option B yields 3.85€ if the throw 
of the die is 1, and it pays 0.10€ if the throw is 2-10. The other decisions are similar, 
except that as you move down the table, the chances of the higher payoff for each 
option increase. In fact, for Decision 10 in the bottom row, the die will not be needed 
since each option pays the highest payoff for sure, so your choice here is between 2.00€ 
or 3.85€. 
 
To summarize, you will make ten choices: for each decision row you will have to 
choose between Option A and Option B. You may choose A for some decision rows 
and B for other rows, and you may change your decisions and make them in any order.  
 
To determine the payoffs from this task we will throw the ten-sided die to select which 
of the ten Decisions will be used. Then we will throw the die again to determine the 
money earnings for the Option you chose for that Decision. 
 
So now please look at the empty boxes on the record sheet. You will have to mark an X 
in one and only one of the boxes in each row, depending whether you prefer option A or 
option B. Then the die throw will determine which of the ten decisions is going to 
count. We will look at the decision that you made for the one that counts, and circle it, 
before throwing the die again to determine your earnings for this part. 
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DECISION FORM 
Option A 
 ⁭  2.00€ with probability of 1/10,    
1.60€ with probability of 9/10              OR 
 ⁭  2.00€with probability of 2/10,    1.60€ 
with probability of 8/10              OR  
 ⁭  2.00€ with probability of 3/10,    
1.60€ with probability of 7/10              OR 
 ⁭  2.00€ with probability of 4/10,    
1.60€ with probability of 6/10              OR 
 ⁭  2.00€ with probability of 5/10,    
1.60€ with probability of 5/10              OR 
 ⁭  2.00€ with probability of 6/10,    
1.60€ with probability of 4/10              OR 
 ⁭  2.00€ with probability of 7/10,    
1.60€ with probability of 3/10              OR 
 ⁭  2.00€ with probability of 8/10,    
1.60€ with probability of 2/10              OR 
 ⁭  2.00€ with probability of 9/10,    
1.60€ with probability of 1/10              OR 
 ⁭  2.00€ with probability of 10/10,    
1.60€ with probability of 0/10              OR 
 
Option B 
 ⁭  3.85€ with probability of 1/10,    
0.10€ with probability of 9/10 
 ⁭  3.85€ with probability of 2/10,    
0.10€ with probability of 8/10 
 ⁭  3.85€ with probability of 3/10,    
0.10€ with probability of 7/10 
 ⁭  3.85€ with probability of 4/10,    
0.10€ with probability of 6/10 
 ⁭  3.85€ with probability of 5/10,    
0.10€ with probability of 5/10 
 ⁭  3.85€ with probability of 6/10,    
0.10€ with probability of 4/10 
 ⁭  3.85€ with probability of 7/10,    
0.10€ with probability of 3/10 
 ⁭  3.85€ with probability of 8/10,    
0.10€ with probability of 2/10 
 ⁭  3.85€ with probability of 9/10,    
0.10€ with probability of 1/10 
 ⁭  3.85€ with probability of 10/10,   
0.10€ with probability of 0/10 
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QUESTIONNAIRE 
 
 
Thank you for participating in the experiment. Finally, please answer the following questions. 
Your answers will have no impact on your final payoff.  
 
1. If you could decide how much to destroy of the other player’s payoff how much would 
you like to destroy?  
 
2. How much of your own payoff would you be willing to pay for it? 
 
3. How old are you? 
 
4. What is your gender? 
 
5. What is your major? 
 
6. In which country were you born/raised? 
 
 
 
